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Richard Dawkins’ The Selfish Gene – en litterær lesning, av Helene Nilsen 
 
Denne masteroppgaven tar sikte på å lese den populærvitenskapelige klassikeren The Selfish 
Gene
1
  på dens egne premisser, med fokus på representasjon og tekstlige strategier. The 
Selfish Gene kan klassifiseres som ’public science’ fordi den både populariserer 
vitenskapelige konsepter for et bredt publikum, og samtidig henvender seg til kollegaer innen 
naturvitenskapene med det Dawkins beskriver som et nytt perspektiv på evolusjonsteori.  
 
Innen enkelte biologiske forskningsmiljøer blir The Selfish Gene regnet som en milepæl i 
evolusjonsteori idet den markerer skiftet fra ”gruppeseleksjon” tanken om at naturlig 
seleksjon fungerer på gruppenivå, til ”genseleksjon”.  
 
Denne analysen vurderer ikke den sannhetsgehalten i det vitenskapelige fundamentet som The 
Selfish Gene bygger på. Ei heller kan lesningen klassifiseres som ”moralsk” eller ”politisk” – 
idet den ikke i videre grad tar stilling til hvorvidt begrepet ”egoisme” bærer med seg moralske 
implikasjoner, og heller ikke argumenterer for at Dawkins gjennom boken promoterer sitt 
personlige politiske syn. Disse aspektene har blitt, og blir stadig, utførlig diskutert. Videre 
dreier lesningen ikke rundt spørsmål som ”Finnes det objektiv sannhet?”  
 
Denne analysen kan snarere leses som et forsøk på å innta et perspektiv løsrevet fra den 
polemiske motsetningen mellom C. P. Snows ”to kulturer” med spørsmålet: Hvordan kan 
litterære leseteknikker applikeres konstruktivt på popularisert vitenskap? Oppgavens første 
kapittel tar utgangspunkt i Foucaults begrep ”forfatterfunksjonen” og diskuterer et utvalg 
forskjellige, og til dels motstridende lesninger av The Selfish Gene. De to følgende kapitlene 
utgjør nærlesningen av boken.  
 
Kapittel 2 fokuserer på bokens fundamentale strukturelle strategier som 
personifisering/besjeling av gener og organismer (så vel som disses ”avsjeling”). I dette 
kapittelet blir også konseptualiseringen av genet, eller replikatoren, i The Selfish Gene 
undersøkt, sammen med den narrative fremstillingen av genetisk seleksjon.  
 
Kapitel 3 tar for seg de forskjellige stemmene som kommer til uttrykk i Dawkins’ 
argumentasjon, både i teksten og i fotnoter/forord, og diskuterer hvordan disse, sammen med 
forfatterfunksjonen, bidrar til instruere lesning og kan sies å konstruere en ideell leser i 
teksten. Videre belyses bruken av analogi i fremstillingen av det genetiske rasjonale som 
teksten etablerer.  
 
Til slutt legges analysen til grunn for en diskusjon av hvilket normativt vitenskapssyn The 
Selfish Gene kan sies å formidle, og av hvordan teksten kan forstås som en lesning av 
naturlige fenomener.  
 
                                                          
1
 Først utgitt i 1976, til norsk i 2002 ved Arne Hem: Det egoistiske genet 
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Introduction: 
 
 
I. Public Science: A Contextual Framework 
 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to employ reading techniques from literary criticism in a reading 
of Richard Dawkins’s work of popular science The Selfish Gene, first published in 1976, and 
generally considered the breakthrough of his authorship. Richard Dawkins, currently 
professor Emeritus teaching Evolutionary Biology and Science Literacy at the New College 
of Humanities in London, has an impressive track-record and a virtually unparalleled 
reputation as a mediator of science. He has made and participated in numerous TV-series 
promoting science as well as giving lectures and participating in the public debate. From 1995 
until 2008, Dawkins held the professorship of Public Understanding of Science at Oxford 
UniversityHis long list of publications includes The Extended Phenotype (1982), The Blind 
Watchmaker, (1986), Unweaving the Rainbow (1998), the collection of essays, A Devil’s 
Chaplain (2003) and The God Delusion (2006). 
 Although The Selfish Gene was published in the 1970s, and thus not as a part of 
Dawkins’s position as promoter of science, it can be situated within the genre of ‘public 
science’.2 Elizabeth Leane, in her book Reading Popular Physics, Disciplinary Skirmishes 
and Textual Strategies, observes a distinction between ‘pop science’ referring to any 
representation of science in the popular culture, such as science fiction series and so forth, and 
                                                          
2
 Leane, Elizabeth: Reading Popular Physics, Disciplinary Skirmishes and Textual Strategies, Ashgate Publishing 
Limited, Hampshire and Burlington 2007, 8 
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‘popular science,’ which may refer to ‘public science’ or ‘public understanding of science’3. 
Leane cites Frank Turner
4
 and his definition of public science as “the body of rhetoric, 
argument and polemic” produced by ‘public scientists’ in the process of “’justifying their 
activities to the political powers and other institutions,’.”5  
 The genre of ‘public science’ and the notion of ‘public scientists’ are connected to 
what Leane refers to as the “popularization boom of the 1990s.”6 In 1995, two books were 
published which addressed the same phenomenon. In the UK, John Carey edited the 
anthology The Faber Book of Science.
7
 In the introduction, he writes:  
Fortunately for this anthology … popular science has improved immensely in the later 
twentieth century. Writers like … Stephen Jay Gould, Peter Medawar, Stephen 
Hawking ... and Richard Dawkins have transformed the genre, combining expert 
knowledge with an urge to be understood, and bridging intelligibility gap to delight 
and instruct huge readerships. In the process, they have created a new kind of late 
twentieth century literature, which demands to be recognized as a separate genre, 
distinct from the old literary forms, and conveying pleasures and triumphs quite 
distinct from theirs.
8
   
 
 This separate genre may be productively categorized as ‘public science’; professional science 
written in an accessible language aimed at a general readership, thus both entertaining and 
informing the public. In the USA, John Brockman edited a collection of interviews with 
‘public scientists,’ including Richard Dawkins, under the title The Third Culture.9 The title 
explicitly refers to C. P. Snow and his Rede lecture, “The Two Cultures” from 195910 where 
he polemically depicted a state of mutual ignorance between the “two polar groups” – 
‘physical scientists’ and ‘literary intellectuals’ the latter of which “incidentally while no one 
                                                          
3
 Ibid 
4
 Frank Turner was  John Hay Whitney Professor of History at Yale University  
5
 Leane, Reading Popular Physics 8 
6
 Ibid 
7
 Carey, John (ed) The Faber Book of Science, Faber and Faber, Ltd, London, 1995 
8
 Ibid xiii 
9
Brockman, John: The Third Culture, Touchstone, New York, 1995, 27  
10
 Snow, C. P. “The Two Cultures” Published by Cambridge University Press, 1959, http://s-f-
walker.org.uk/pubsebooks/2cultures/Rede-lecture-2-cultures.pdf 
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was looking [had taken to] referring to themselves as 'intellectuals' as though there were no 
others.”11 While Snow proposed a potential third culture, Brockman’s Third Culture does not 
correspond to this suggestion:  
In Snow’s third culture, the literary intellectuals would be on speaking terms with the 
scientists. Although I borrow Snow’s phrase, it does not describe the third culture he 
predicted. Literary intellectuals are not communicating with scientists. Scientists are 
communicating directly with the general public ... what traditionally has been called 
“science” has today become “public culture.”12  
  
In Brockman’s Third Culture, then, the contributors are seen as redefining the conception of 
culture altogether, inscribing ‘public scientists’ as the new intellectuals in what appears to be 
a cultural revolution, a democratization-process of knowledge distribution:  
Throughout history, intellectual life has been marked by the fact that only a small 
number of people have done the serious thinking for everybody else. What we are 
witnessing is a passing of the torch from one group of thinkers, the traditionally 
literary intellectuals, to a new group, the intellectuals of the emerging third culture.
13
 
  
The Third Culture ‘manifesto’ furthermore represents a literal understanding of the battle of 
‘two cultures’ presumably resulting in victory and defeat on the part of the combatants: “The 
Third Culture consists of those scientists and other thinkers in the empirical world who, 
through their work and expository writing, are taking the place of the traditional intellectual in 
rendering visible the deeper meanings of our lives, redefining who and what we are.”14 The 
‘passing of the torch,’ and the notion that Third Culture thinkers are ‘taking the place of 
literary intellectuals’ suggest that there is room for only one point of view from which the 
questions of ‘who and what we are’ may be defined and answered; it is Snow’s polemical 
device of a battle of ‘two cultures’ taken to its literal extreme.  
                                                          
11
 Ibid 2 
12
 Brockman, The Third Culture 18 
13
 Ibid 19 
14
 Ibid 17 
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 This somewhat aggressive attitude should be seen in the context of the so-called 
Science Wars which was largely played out in USA during the 1990s, culminating in the 
famous Sokal-hoax in 1996, where Alan Sokal, Professor of Physics at New York University, 
succeeded in publishing a gibberish article in the academic journal Social Text, thus allegedly 
‘disrobed’ postmodern theorists as ‘intellectual imposters’.15 The debate between 
representatives of the ‘soft’ and the ‘hard sciences’ was, as the term suggests, heated and 
rather counterproductive in that it mainly served to confirm and deepen the gap between these 
two generalizations of academic traditions. In the process, representatives of the ‘soft 
sciences’ were to some extent made synonymous with ‘constructivists’. As Leane comments, 
“it appears that both constructivist critics and those who defend science against 
constructivism often resort to building their arguments around a caricature of their opponent’s 
view”.16  
Richard Dawkins arguably advocates the Third Culture ‘manifesto’ in his essay 
“Postmodernism Disrobed” which was first published in Nature Magazine in 1998,17 and 
reprinted in Dawkins’s essay-collection A Devil’s Chaplain in 2003:  
 
Suppose you are an intellectual impostor with nothing to say, but with strong 
ambitions to succeed in academic life, collect a coterie of reverent disciples and have 
students around the world anoint your pages with respectful yellow highlighter. What 
kind of literary style would you cultivate? Not a lucid one, surely, for clarity would 
expose your lack of content.
18
  
 
 
Dawkins’s criticism is seemingly directed towards American postmodern theorists: “how 
shall we know whether modish French 'philosophy', whose disciples and exponents have all 
but taken over large sections of American academic life, is genuinely profound or the vacuous 
                                                          
15
 Dawkins, Richard  “Postmodernism Disrobed” from A Devil’s Chaplain 2004 (2003) 48-53 
16
 Leane 2007, 77  
17
 Nature, No 394, 9th of July 1998, 141-143  
18
 Dawkins, “Postmodernism Disrobed” 48 
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rhetoric of mountebanks and charlatans?”19 Leaving ‘philosophy’ in quotation suggests that 
the criticism is not only directed towards the ‘disciples and exponents’ of French philosophy, 
but aims to devaluate French philosophy represented by Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida 
as sham intellectualism. Similarly, Cambridge University is placed in a ridiculous light 
because it “saw fit to give Jacques Derrida an honorary degree.”20 The prominent position of 
this ‘modish philosophy’ seemingly justifies the annihilation of a school of thought, in the 
place of an approach criticising specifically defined problems of a mode of discourse. In this 
generalization, the postmodern philosophic jargon becomes the counterpoint to an ideal clear-
thinking scientific discourse. Within this paradigm, the notion of ‘public science’ and of 
‘public scientists’ communicating scientific ideas in a clear and accessible language can be 
seen as a deliberate effort to counteract excessive use of academic jargon.  
 
 
II. Science and Literature: The Selfish Gene as Public Science  
 
 
Although The Selfish Gene, as mentioned, was written in 1976 and thus cannot be said to 
promote Brockman’s Third Culture as such, the genre features of a type of public science are 
evident in the preface to the first edition, where Dawkins reflexively dedicates the book to 
“three imaginary readers” 21: 
First, the general reader, the layman. ... I have worked hard to try and 
popularize some subtle and complicated ideas in non-mathematical language, without 
losing their essence. I do not know how far I have succeeded in this, nor how far I 
have succeeded in another of my ambitions: to try and make the book as entertaining 
and gripping as its subject matter deserves ...  
                                                          
19
 Ibid 53 
20
 Ibid  
21
 The Selfish Gene xxi 
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My second imaginary reader was the expert. He has been a harsh critic, sharply 
drawing in his breath at some of my analogies and figures of speech. His favourite 
phrases are ‘with the exception of’; ‘but on the other hand’; and ‘ugh’. I listened to 
him attentively, and even completely rewrote one chapter entirely for his benefit, but 
in the end I have had to tell the story my way ... Yet my greatest hope is that even he 
will find something new here; a new way of looking at familiar ideas perhaps; even 
stimulation of new ideas of his own ... 
The third reader I had in mind was the student, making the transition from 
layman to expert ... For the student who has already committed himself to zoology, I 
hope that my book may have some educational value ... 
22
 
 
The lay-reader, of course, represents the popular appeal of the book. The act of 
popularization, according to Leane, mediates between different communities in diverse ways: 
In a basic sense, it translates scientific ideas so that they become accessible to lay-readers; “it 
is a communication from an expert to a reader outside of his/her specialist field.”23 In this 
process, “scientists come into immediate contact with the tools of the literary trade.”24 
Popularization as translation of established scientific concepts becomes a creative process 
opening for a range of literary devices. In this sense it may be seen as a liberation from the 
somewhat rigid conventions of professional scientific papers, such as the use of the passive 
voice and the so-called IMRAD-model consisting of Introduction, Methods, Results and 
Discussion.
25
 The translation of science into an accessible language opens for a mediation 
between science and literature.  
Dr. Paola Spinozzi, Senior Lecturer in English Literature at the University of Ferarra, 
comments on this process in her essay “Representing and Narrativizing Science”26:  
Translating in accessible or creative ways what has been defined in scientific terms 
proper entails actively taking part in the production of and response to scientific 
knowledge. Multiple forces work together dynamically: the exposition of scientific 
methods and theories through explanation and argumentation; narrativizing and 
                                                          
22
 Ibid xxi – xxii 
23
 Ibid 3-4 
24
 Ibid 4 
25
 Hurwitz Brian and Paola Spinozzi, Eds: Discourses and Narrations in the Biosciences, V&R Unipress, 
Goettingen, 2011, 14 
26
 Spinozzi, Paola: “Representing and Narrativizing Science”: Hurwitz and Spinozzi  2011, 30-60 
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fictionalization through different modes of emplotment and reference to characters; 
self-reflexivity and meta-discourse, evidenced in a conscious use of language as a 
medium that transforms scientific knowledge in representation.
27
 
 
Spinozzi points out how literary strategies such as narrativation are closely linked to 
fictionalization, and the creative process of translation has the potential of ‘transforming 
scientific knowledge’.   
 Dawkins’s expert reader, however, suggests that this is not merely a translation of 
‘what has been defined in scientific terms proper’; it is also conveying new scientific 
perspectives to other experts. Thus, the lay-reader is invited into the realm of science in the 
making. The expert reader in a sense warrants for scientific quality: ‘he has been a harsh 
critic,’ and his presence establishes an authority of the book, demanding to be taken seriously.  
The essential focus in the field of Science and Literature is that of representation, and 
this is also the focus of my thesis. This perspective, however, does not mean ‘reducing’ 
scientific language to ‘fiction’, as Charlotte Sleigh points out in her book Literature and 
Science
28
:  
[M]etaphors and images act as frames for knowledge. They allow us to understand 
scientific ideas, and they actively affect our understanding. As such, scientific facts are 
always embedded in their representation, a phenomenon which is in large part 
subjective and literary or artistic … Only when they have words and images attached 
to them are they meaningful to us – and these words and meanings bring along a 
whole host of allusions, history and connotations that themselves become part of the 
representation as the science is further developed … [T]he argument about 
representation does not state that science is ‘merely fiction’. Rather, it recognizes the 
contingent construction of scientific representation and the embedding of its symbols 
in the language and culture of its time.
29
     
 
 
 
                                                          
27
 Ibid 55 
28 Sleigh, Charlotte, Literature and Science, Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire 2011 
29
 Ibid 5-6 
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III. Motivation, Difficulties and Methodological Approach  
 
 
My own initial motivation for this thesis was a vague feeling of discomfort, brought on by 
public science mediation such as the Norwegian TV-series Hjernevask,
30
 which polemically 
juxtaposed the ideas of ‘soft sciences’ with the facts of the ‘hard sciences’, and Richard 
Dawkins’s TV-series The Genius of Charles Darwin,31 where evolutionary theory and natural 
selection are polemically presented in a scientific, social and philosophic context. On the one 
hand, the polemical note struck me as unjustified, while on the other, the productions rested 
on the authority of scientific fact, which it was not my prerogative to refute. The approach to 
science that these TV-series offered seemed on the one hand to me to trespass into the realms 
of metaphysics particularly when methods of the ‘soft sciences’ were contrasted to the 
verifiable evidence of physical science and these were used to explain social phenomena. The 
way physical evidence was presented suggested that interpretation and representation was 
downplayed, as if scientific evidence, as it were, spoke for themselves. On the other hand, the 
notion that the physical sciences are concerned with a material reality rather than with 
language and interpretation is prevalent, also in academic communities. Still, I had a feeling 
that the TV-series somehow abused the authority that reference to verifiable evidence gives.   
On this background I attended the two courses at the University of Bergen, organized 
by the Centre for the Studies of Sciences and the Humanities and the English Department 
respectively. One was Human: Nature and Culture
32
, offering a series of lectures by 
                                                          
30
 Direct translation: Brainwash, broadcasted on NRK 1 during the Spring of 2010 and hosted by the Norwegian 
comedian Harald Eia, produced by Harald Eia and Martin Ihle 
31
 Broadcasted on NRK2 in January 2009, written and presented by Dawkins, Richard, produced by Russel 
Barnes and Dan Hillman, distributed by British Channel 4 and Richard Dawkins Foundation for Reason and 
Science 
32
 Dannelsesmodul, VIT 210: Menneske: Natur og Kultur, coordinated by Jan Reinert Karlsen 
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representatives from the humanities as well as evolutionary biologists, thus encountering 
science in a more formal setting. In this forum, and through discussion with fellow students, I 
began to understand that science is not a hermetically closed sphere, but may be productively 
approached and debated. Subsequently, I attended the course Science and Literature,
33
 where 
I was introduced to Gillian Beer’s impressive work Darwin’s Plots34 in which Darwin’s On 
the Origin of Species
35
 is subjected to literary analysis and situated in a cultural context. The 
book explores the relationship between thought and language, between science and its 
representation, and demonstrates how imagination and metaphor can play important parts in 
the creation of scientific theory in the initial phase when “a fact is not quite a scientific fact at 
all.”36 Beer’s tour de force demonstrates how a literary reading may indeed function 
productively in illuminating how language constraints and contributes to scientific thinking, 
and how the metaphors of scientific representation may gain a life of their own in the 
encounter with the public. Her analysis, rather than ‘disrobing’ scientific representation, 
serves to open up the text and, by demonstrating its many layers of potential meaning, shows 
how scientific representation may come to signify. Beers offers the crucial insight that: 
“One’s relationship to ideas depends significantly on whether one has read the works which 
formulate them. Ideas pass more rapidly into the state of assumptions when they are unread. 
Reading is an essentially question-raising procedure.”37 Beer’s reading thus operates outside 
of the somewhat restricting construction of ‘the two cultures’. 
From this starting-point, I decided to make Richard Dawkins’s The Selfish Gene the 
subject of my thesis, and to use Beer’s Darwin’s Plots as a methodological framework. This 
seemed like a workable prospect, since both writers are concerned with evolution and both 
                                                          
33
 By Randi Koppen, Fall 2010 
34
 Beer, Gillian: Darwin’s Plots, 3
rd
 ed. Cambridge University Press, 2009 (1983) 4 (Beer’s italics)  
35
 Darwin, Charles, The Origin of Species, (1859), Oxford University Press, 2008 
36
  Beer Darwin’s Plots 2 
37
 Ibid 4 (Beer’s italics) 
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address a general readership as well as other experts. Two problems may be distinguished in 
my initial approach. One was practical: Beer’s historical approach was not directly 
transferable to a reading of The Selfish Gene, because the scientific ideas the book promotes 
are still subject to scientific debate. The publication history of The Selfish Gene testifies to its 
prevailing relevance: The original edition was published in 1976, followed by a second 
edition in 1989 featuring two additional chapters and a new preface as well as explanatory and 
commentary end-notes, featuring modifications and response to criticism as well as reference 
to later research. In 2006, at the anniversary for the original publication, the book was re-
published as a 30
th
 Anniversary Edition featuring an additional preface. Furthermore, and 
obviously, the science of the Victorian Age is not automatically comparable to contemporary 
science.  
The second problem of my initial approach was more personal than methodological. 
Although I was aware of the pitfall of an overly ‘constructivist’ approach, and did not set out 
to contest the notion of objective knowledge, my reading was initially influenced by the 
unease that motivated my interest for this field of research in the first place, in the sense that 
the first drafts of my thesis were written with the aim of justifying the notion of scientific 
‘trespassing’. An emotional reading aiming simply to challenge an ‘authority of science’ 
would constitute a framework in which Beer’s methodological concepts would function as 
weapons of destruction, quite the contrary to how they are employed in Darwin’s Plots. In 
consequence, the reading would rest on presumption, an in effect leaving the text unread. 
Therefore, I had to work to disentangle my analysis from of the perspective arising from my 
original discomfort to enable an enquiry into the cause of this unease.  
Although I abandoned the idea of performing a comparative analysis of Beer’s Darwin 
and Dawkins’s The Selfish Gene, I found that some of Beer’s textual approaches could still 
constitute a starting point of enquiry. In particular her observations concerning the 
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anthropocentric nature of language and the challenge of tackling a language that is imbued 
with intention in describing a faceless process of evolution have proved productive for my 
reading. I have, however, not adopted Beer’s approach to authorship. Whereas her reading of 
the Origin takes into consideration Darwin’s personal journals, letters and notebooks in order 
to illuminate and support her reading, I have been concerned with the tension between the 
explicit intention of The Selfish Gene and the potential meanings that appear in a close-
reading. This approach has been particularly fruitful due to the publication history of 
Dawkins’s book, where the added material of subsequent edition has introduced different in-
text voices. However, this reading strategy too has been inspired by Beer, who distinguishes 
the active voice of the Origin as a “necessary methodological control.”38 
While Beer’s work has been a great inspiration, it cannot be said to be suited for 
addressing the scientific perspective that The Selfish Gene conveys. As due attention has been 
paid to the moral implications of the notion gene selfishness, I have not performed a 
particularly political, moral or ideological reading of Dawkins’s book in this thesis. Rather, I 
have tried to read the book on its own terms, and to take into consideration its status in the 
community of evolutionary biology. Leane observes the potential of public science to “act as 
forums for scientists to promote or defend rival views within a scientific field, or to engage, 
implicitly or explicitly, in cross-disciplinary debate.”39 The fundamental and explicit scientific 
view that The Selfish Gene promotes is that of ‘gene selection’ as opposed to ‘group selection’ 
– the notion that natural selection benefits the ‘survival of the species’ and works for ‘the 
good of the species’.  A key issue in the debate of the level of natural selection – group level, 
individual level and gene level – is the question of natural altruism, for instance of whether 
individual can be said put their own life to risk for the benefit of the group. As mentioned, I 
                                                          
38
  Beer Darwin’s Plots 61 
39
 Leane Reading Popular Physics 4  
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have not performed a moral reading, and thus, my thesis is not structured around the 
dichotomy of selfishness ≠ altruism. This subject will, however be addressed with reference to 
other readings of The Selfish Gene.  
In the process of establishing the book’s ‘own terms’, I have studied works both by 
those of Dawkins’s peers who agree with his selfish gene theory, such as the biologist Alan 
Grafen, and opponents within the scientific community, such as Fern-Elsdon Baker, and Mary 
Midgley. Furthermore, I have examined how the gene concept of The Selfish Gene correlates 
to other gene conceptions. This is not to say that I have worked to evaluate the scientific 
contents in an effort to establish the truth-value of The Selfish Gene. This thesis is concerned 
with the act of scientific representation that the book performs. Scientific representation 
cannot, however, be regarded as situated outside of discourse, or outside of the culture of its 
time. Science is both a part of a common culture, and a distinct culture with its own criteria 
and conventions of representation and meaning, which I have, at least to some extent, paid 
heed to. At the same time, science and literature are two distinct disciplines, and it is the 
differences of the academic traditions that make the interplay between the two interesting. It 
has been a challenge to try and strike a balance between an overly critical reading on the one 
hand, and an overly sympathetic reading on the other, and rather make use of the tools of 
literary criticism in order to open up the text and investigate the effects of textual strategies. 
 One such textual strategy is that of narration: Greg Myers, Professor of Rhetoric and 
Communication at Lancaster University, finds that the mode of narrativity is a central aspect 
distinguishing popular and professional science writing:  
The professional articles I study create what I call a narrative of science: they follow     
the argument of the scientist, arrange time into parallel series of simultaneous events 
all supporting their claim, and emphasize in their syntax and vocabulary the 
conceptual structure of their discipline. The popularizing articles, on the other hand, 
present a sequential narrative of nature in which the plant or animal, not the scientific 
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activity, is the subject, the narrative is chronological, and the syntax and vocabulary 
emphasize the externality of nature to scientific practices.
40
 
   
  The three ‘imaginary readers’ of The Selfish Gene introduced above illustrate how 
the book at once popularizes science for the benefit of the lay-reader and addresses an expert 
audience with new scientific perspectives. This duality, which I have categorized as ‘public 
science’, is reflected in the narrative strategies in the book: The opening of the argument 
introducing the gene is presented chronologically as a ‘narrative of nature,’ while the latter 
half of the book follows a ‘narrative of science’ introducing a series of models and examples, 
organized as illustrations of Dawkins’s argument. This argument, or narrative of science, is 
based in the concept of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS),
41
 where Game Theory, often 
illustrated by the Prisoner’s Dilemma, is used in mathematical analysis of animal behaviour, 
working out ‘cost-benefit calculations’ for particular strategies, i.e. relatively stable patterns 
of animal behaviour. The central argument of The Selfish Gene is that natural selection 
favours strategies that benefit the survival of genes, rather than individual bodies or entire 
species.  
Thus, the narrative of the gene can be said to constitute a fundament upon which the 
argument – the narrative of science – is developed. Thus, the two modes of narration are 
intertwined. Leane comments on the function of the narrative of nature:  
 [A]ssumptions (about the world, or about science) embedded in popularizers’ 
narrative structures may not be recognized as such. It is important, then, for critics not 
to dismiss the narrative conventions of popular science as only a kind of formal sugar-
coating over the ‘hard’ scientific content, but to subject them to analysis.42 
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In this thesis, I will analyze the narrative of nature, and considered how it may be said to 
function as a supporting component for the argument of selfish genes. Additionally, I shall 
also take into consideration a second scientific narrative: the Kuhnian notion of scientific 
development as a linear movement of progress.
43
 I have also looked at other textual strategies 
in The Selfish Gene, such as the power of analogy and personification, which is a key 
component structuring the book. Along with an active voice guiding the reading, the structural 
device of personification can be said to urge a ‘willed suspension of disbelief’ on the part of 
the reader, which is reflected in the opening lines to the preface to the first edition of The 
Selfish Gene: “This book should be read almost as if it were science fiction. It is designed to 
appeal to the imagination. But it is not science fiction: it is science.”44 This opening at once 
enters into a dialogue with the reader with an injunction to both believe and not believe – thus 
emphasizing the tension between the fictional devices and the scientific message of 
popularization.   
 
 
IV. Thesis Outline 
 
 
Chapter 1 takes Foucault’s article “What is an author?” 45 as its point of departure. After 
discussing how Dawkins may be seen as a reader of Darwin, I will go on to discuss Foucault’s 
concept of the author-function, before I move on to consider some different readings of and 
approaches to The Selfish Gene. With reference to a polemic between Dawkins and Mary 
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Midgley, I will also establish Dawkins as a reader of his own book, and account for his 
concept of poetic science.  
Chapter 2, entitled “The Language of Convenience and Displaced Agency in The 
Selfish Gene”, constitutes the first part of my close reading. This chapter is concerned with 
what I consider to be the fundamental structural strategies of the book, such as 
personification, narration and the gene-definition that The Selfish Gene operates with. The 
latter particularly regards the relationship between genotype, an individual’s set of genes, and 
phenotype, the genes’ realization in terms of physical traits. Furthermore, I will examine the 
representation of the body as ‘survival machine’, both in terms of its function and its effect.  
In Chapter 3, “Reading Nature” I extend the perspective of my close reading. The first 
half of this chapter addresses the multiple voices of The Selfish Gene, which I will categorize 
as author-function, the reflexive narrator and the meta-narrator, with particular focus on their 
potential to exert ‘methodological control’. These categories are not meant to represent fixed 
entities, but different functions. From this starting point, I will show how the reader is 
addressed and situated in the text, and go on to argue that the multiple voices of the book 
appeal to an ‘ideal reader’. The focus of the second half of the chapter examines the meaning 
potential of analogy, and discusses how this meaning potential affects the construction of a 
‘genetic rationale’  
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Chapter 1: Reading The Selfish Gene 
 
 
In 1976, a young Oxford biologist published  
a book called The Selfish Gene. To Richard  
Dawkins’ own surprise and sometimes alarm, it  
became widely discussed, often misunderstood,  
and highly influential.
46
  
 
 
 
1.1 What is an Author? 
 
 
In his essay “What is an Author?” Foucault separates between scientific discourse and other 
discourses. The distinction is based in two aspects. One is that of the author-function, the 
function of the author’s name:  
The author’s name manifests the appearance of a certain discursive set and indicates 
the status of this discourse within a society and a culture … [W]e could say that in a 
civilization like our own, there are a certain number of discourses that are endowed 
with the ‘author-function’ while others are deprived of it.47   
 
Foucault observes a reversal in scientific discourse: While medieval texts dealing with issues 
that we would now call scientific relied on author-name to guarantee truth, a reversal occurred 
in the seventeenth or eighteenth century, with the author-function fading away. Instead, 
scientific discourses were “received for themselves, in the anonymity of an established or 
always redemonstrable truth.”48 The anonymity of the author can be said to represent and 
support the notion that science ‘speaks for itself’, that it exists outside of language. One 
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expression of the scientific practice of writing outside of the author-function could for 
instance be the conventional use of the passive in scientific texts. However as I have shown 
above, the genre of ‘public science’ which Dawkins represents does not adhere to these 
conventions.  
I will return to the author-function after having discussed another aspect that, 
according to Foucault, distinguishes scientific from other discourses, namely the concept of 
“founders of discursivity”: “They are unique in that they are not just the author of their own 
works. They have produced something else: the possibilities and the rules for the formation of 
other texts.”49 Founders of discursivity, then, are authors of works that provide a new 
approach or perspective, or even works that cause reactions leading to a different insight, 
providing a “possibility for something other than their discourse, yet something belonging to 
what they founded.”50 Foucault uses Marx and Freud as prime examples of founders of 
discursivity, and contrasts them to scientific discourse: “Re-examination of Galileo’s text may 
well change our knowledge of the history of mechanics, but it will never be able to change 
mechanics itself. On the other hand, re-examination of Freud’s text, modifies psychoanalysis 
…”51 Following this argument, re-examination of the scientific founders’ works cannot 
contribute to further research, because the original discourse becomes irrelevant in the course 
of scientific development. In other words, it seems that scientific truth relies on objective 
findings in research rather than the authority of the founder: 
[O]ne defines a proposition’s theoretical validity in relation to the works of the 
founder – while, in the case of Galileo and Newton, it is in relation to what physics or 
cosmology is (in its intrinsic structure and normativity) that one affirms the validity of 
any proposition that those men have put forth.
52
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 In this perspective, science is seen as intrinsically progressive, in the sense that it is scientific 
progress, in terms of new findings and developments leading to increased knowledge that 
constitutes truth-value, rather than the founder of a specific discourse. Peter Baehr, in his 
work Founders, Classics, Canons (2002) notes that “It would appear, then, that in regard to 
the founding figure there is a recursive durability, a reflexivity, to ‘discourses’ that is typically 
absent in ‘sciences’.”53 Following Baehr’s line of argument, the separation between founders 
of science and founders of discourse seems to rest on the assumption that scientific 
development is a progressive mechanistic event, where new perspectives of universal validity 
replace each other on the basis of scientific truths detached from the scientific work that 
originated the theoretical discipline. However, as I will demonstrate below, the concept of 
‘founders of discourse’ is tractable also in scientific discourse. It is worth adding that Foucault 
did not see the differences between scientific and other discourses as categorical: “It is not 
always easy to distinguish between the two; moreover, nothing proves that they are two 
mutually exclusive procedures.”54  
 Dawkins refers to himself as a Neo-Darwinist. Modern Neo-Darwinism traces back to 
the 1930s, when ‘the modern synthesis’ of genetic inheritance was developed by Haldane, 
Wright and Fisher, implementing theories from genetics in the field of evolutionary biology, 
or natural selection, known as Darwinism.
55
 From this starting point, Hamilton and Fisher 
established a perspective on natural selection from what is understood as the gene’s-eye point 
of view, a concept which The Selfish Gene develops further.
56
 Needless to say, the label Neo-
Darwinism carries with it a reference to Darwin’s original work. This back-referring 
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corresponds to what Foucault describes as one of the characteristics of works by founders of 
discursivity: 
[O]ne does not declare certain propositions of these founders to be false: instead, when 
trying to seize the act of founding, one sets aside those statements that are not 
pertinent, either because they are deemed inessential, or because they are considered 
‘prehistoric’ and derived from another type of discursivity.57    
 
While Darwin had no clear-cut conception of genes or genetic inheritance, his proposition of 
natural selection was not seen as false after the appearance of genetics. Instead, the concept of 
natural selection has been extended so as to include the gene as its primus motor. 
Additionally, Darwin had a speculative notion of pangenesis: “particles that preserve 
variations from generation to generation.”58 The concept of pangenesis has, according to 
Elsdon-Baker, largely been ignored, or ’deemed inessential’, until recently,59 but the 
somewhat ‘prehistoric’ genetic conception has not devaluated Darwin’s evolutionary theory 
as such. While Darwin was not the only one working on evolutionary ideas in the 19
th
 
century,
60
 his concept of natural selection has made him the father of modern evolutionary 
theory. Elsdon-Baker puts it like this: “[I] believe Darwin rightly has pride and prominence as 
the father of modern evolutionary theory. It was Darwin, and only Darwin, who had the 
vision, persistence and clarity of thought to turn it from a great idea into a comprehensive 
theory.
61
    
 The term Neo-Darwinism also seems to meet Foucault’s definition of a founder of 
discursivity, in that “one defines a proposition’s theoretical validity in relation to the works of 
the founder,”62 rather than in relation to the normativity of the discipline. One might also say 
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that Darwinism is presented as the normativity of evolutionary theory. The founder as 
authority is detectable in The Selfish Gene: [T]he group selection idea is so deeply ingrained 
that Lorenz … evidently did not realize that the statement contravened the orthodox 
Darwinian theory.”63 However, not only Neo-Darwinists, but also their opponents may refer 
to Darwin as founding father and authority. Elsdon-Baker quotes the biologists Jablonka and 
Lamb:  
In evolutionary studies, because heritable non-genetic variations are often induced by 
the environment, we have to expand our notion of heredity and variation to include the 
inheritance of acquired variations, the once disparaged idea that was part of Lamarck’s 
theory. In a sense, we have to go back to Darwin’s original, pluralistic convictions. 
Darwin, unlike many of his dogmatic followers, saw a role for induced variation in 
evolution. Today, in the light of newly discovered epigenetic mechanisms, Darwinian 
evolution should include descent with epigenetic as well as genetic modifications, and 
natural selection of induced as well as random variations. Certainly, it should not be 
reduced to ‘selfish genes’.64    
 
The appeal to Darwin in order to re-examine evolutionary ideas, corresponds to what Foucault 
describes as a necessity to turn “back to the origin65”: “The return is not a historical 
supplement which would be added to the discursivity, or merely an ornament; on the contrary, 
it constitutes an effective and necessary task of transforming the discursive practice itself.”66 
 The plea to re-examine Darwin’s theories in order to transform the discursive practice 
of evolutionary theory can be seen as necessitated by the power of definition held by Neo-
Darwinists which Elsdon-Baker finds problematic: “Challenges to the Neo-Darwinian 
synthesis are sometimes represented as challenges to Darwinism. Similarly, Neo-Darwinists 
conflate their own ideas with Darwinism.”67 This observation illuminates the aspect of 
reading which is intrinsic to all discourse: the act of focusing on certain aspects while 
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excluding those that do not seem pertinent, simply the act of interpreting. Elsdon-Baker sees 
the neo-Darwinian reading of Darwinian theory as problematic for several reasons.  First, on a 
general level, that this kind categorization of evolutionary theory may function counter-
productively: “[I]n embracing the idea of ‘Darwinism’ or ‘Neo-Darwinism’ rather than 
evolutionary theory, we are perhaps creating an intellectual straitjacket for ourselves.”68 We 
could read this as a normative claim corresponding to Foucault’s notion of separating 
scientific discourses: Ideal sciences should be established in relation to the normativity of the 
discipline rather than in relation to its founder. Furthermore, the phrase Neo-Darwinian gives 
the impression of being a mere extension of the original Darwinian ideas. These ideas may, 
then, be made to encompass a wider meaning than there are grounds for. Elsdon-Baker is 
specifically concerned with the place of religion in the neo-Darwinian theory:  
We clearly can no longer caricature the shift in thinking after the publication of On the 
Origin of Species as a leap from universal acceptance of ‘creationism’ to a battle to get 
evolutionary thought accepted … it implies a level of animosity between ‘religious 
thinkers’ and ‘scientific evolutionary thinkers’ which is both a misrepresentation and 
misleading.
69
  
 
In the opening passage of The Selfish Gene we get an impression of the ‘level of animosity’ 
between the two modes of thinking:  
Living organisms had existed on earth, without ever knowing why, for over three 
thousand million years before the truth finally dawned on one of them. His name was 
Charles Darwin. To be fair, others had had inklings of the truth, but it was Darwin 
who first put together a coherent and tenable account of why we exist. Darwin made it 
possible for us to give a sensible answer to the curious child whose question heads this 
chapter. We no longer have to resort to superstition when faced with the deep 
problems: Is there a meaning to life? What are we for? What is man?
70
  
 
The problem, Elsdon-Baker points out, is that Darwinism becomes an altogether too inclusive 
category, for several reasons: one is that this portrayal of evolution does not separate between 
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the ‘origin of species’ and the ‘origin of life’,71 another that it goes beyond what is normally 
accepted to be the parameters of science.
72
 However, the over-arching issue with the strong 
focus on the metaphysical impact of Darwinism is that it becomes much more dangerous to 
discuss problems regarding evolutionary theory publically, because critics may be seen as 
representing the ‘wrong camp’.73  
 The consequences of this kind of either-or problem in relying on the founding 
authority of a discourse also become evident when attributed to Lamarckism, particularly with 
regard to the concept of inherited characteristics, as in the case referred to above, where two 
biologists criticized the concept of selfish genes and wished to ‘expand the notion of 
heredity’. If the Neo-Darwinian reading of Darwin is accepted as the only reading of 
evolutionary theory, then statements such as these may be labelled ‘anti-Darwinian’.74 As 
Feldon-Baker shows, this is to some extent what is at stake in the neo-Darwinian discussion; 
to establish the ‘true’ Darwinism. While a re-examination of Darwin’s texts will not change 
the course of evolution, it could change evolutionary biology theory and research.   
 In the context of the above discussion it is possible to establish Dawkins as a reader of 
Darwin. On this background, evolutionary representation in the Origin may also be relevant 
for analyzing the writings of Dawkins. However, Dawkins is, of course, also an author. But 
what is an author? While the above perspectives of Elsdon-Baker is mainly concerned with 
Dawkins as a critic of religion and with the somewhat antagonistic tone in much of his 
writing, there are, as we shall see, several other takes on Dawkins as an author.  Foucault 
points out that   
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One cannot turn a proper name into a pure and simple reference. It has more than an 
indication, a gesture, a finger pointed at someone, it is the equivalent of description … 
The proper name and the author’s name are situated between the two poles of 
description and designation.
75
 
 
Description, e.g. biographical details, and designation: the attributes that a reader may assign 
the author, come together in the act of reading. This relationship is further complicated in The 
Selfish Gene which deviate from the conventions of scientific papers and use elements from 
fiction, or the essay, such as an active first person structuring the text. When performing a 
reading where the author is apparently homogenous to the first person speaking, the 
boundaries may become blurred between the ‘proper name and the individual named’, in this 
case also between the narrator and the author. Reading Dawkins, then, can be closely linked 
to the act of establishing the author-function; in fact, the act of reading Dawkins’ texts may 
become equal to the act of establishing the author-function: 
[T]he author-function … does not develop spontaneously as the attribution of a 
discourse to an individual. It is, rather, the result of a complex operation which 
constructs a certain rational being that we call ‘author’. Critics doubtless try to give 
this intelligible being a realistic status, by discerning a ‘deep’ motive, a ‘creative 
power’, or a ‘design,’ the milieu in which writing originates. Nevertheless, these 
aspects of an individual which we designate as making him an author are only a 
projection, in more or less psychologizing terms, of the operations that we force texts 
to undergo, the connections that we make, the traits that we establish as pertinent, the 
continuities that we recognize, or the exclusions that we practice.
76
 
 
The author-function, then, is not an absolute figure; it is created by and in the process of 
reading. Elsdon-Baker’s portrayal of Dawkins as author-function can be recognized as a 
projection of a ‘deep motive’ of religion-criticism: “[Dawkins] has presented himself as 
standing at the vanguard of clear-thinking rational science, fighting against a swelling tide of 
fanatical delusionists.”77.  By other readers, the focus on Dawkins as author-function is his 
status as an eminent and revolutionary scientist. In the preface to the anthology with the 
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telling title: Richard Dawkins: How a Scientist Changed the Way We Think
78
, edited by 
Dawkins’ former students, Alan Grafen and Mark Ridley, we find an example of the author-
function as ‘creative power’: “We can think of no more fitting tribute to a figure so exactingly 
logical in science, so patiently lucid in promoting the public understanding of science, and so 
outspoken and clear-headed in the public sphere.”79 Here the establishing of the author-
function is directed at the scientific qualities of Dawkins’s work.  
Daniel Dennett focuses on the philosophical qualities of Dawkins, thus creating a 
fundamentally different author-function:  
[Dawkins] is just as leery (sic) of idle armchair speculation and hypersnickety logic-
chopping as any hard-bitten chemist or microbiologists ... My high opinion of his 
philosophical method is hard for me to separate, of course, with my deep agreement 
with the conclusions and proposals he arrives at.
80
  
 
This quote illustrates not only the different constructions of the author-function, but also that 
the perception of the author will colour the reading in terms of what is found pertinent and 
representative, and what is excluded. Dennett here sees Dawkins as an eminent philosopher, 
but a construction of Dawkins as philosopher is not one-sided. Andrew Goatly performs a 
very different reading of the philosophical qualities of the author function:  
According to Dawkins’ The Selfish Gene (1990) human behaviour can in fact be 
explained by the drive to pass on our genes ...  
Selfish gene theory has been developed into sophisticated mathematical 
models, in an attempt to explain, or explain away, altruistic behaviour. The theory 
quite clearly echoes the economic and political philosophies of Reaganism-
Thatcherism (Chase-Dunn and Gills 2003).
81
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The author-function is here projected as a political figure. The phrase ‘in an attempt to’ 
illustrates that the perceived author-function represents the intention of the text. Therefore, the 
political meaning potential of the book is seen as representative of the author-function.    
 The above examples do not necessarily represent an exhaustive representation of the 
author-function that the readers project to the text, nor would I here evaluate their 
approximation to the ‘real’ Dawkins. Rather they illustrate how a depiction of an author-
function is never exclusive or all-encompassing, but depends on the perspective from which 
one reads.  
As mentioned above, part of the difficulties in reading Dawkins’s works is to separate 
between the author-function and the bio-factual individual, due to the active first person voice 
that structures the texts. The separation is further complicated by Dawkins’s use of his own 
person to modify and control potential meaning. In relation to the quote above, and as an 
answer to similar criticism, Dawkins writes in an end-note to the second edition of The Selfish 
Gene: 
I must add that the occasional political asides in this chapter make uncomfortable 
rereading for me in 1989. ‘How many times must this [the need to restrain selfish 
greed to prevent the destruction of the whole group] have been said in recent years to 
the working people in Britain?’ (p. 8) makes me sound like a Tory! In 1975, when this 
was written, a socialist government which I had helped to vote in was battling 
desperately against 23 per cent inflation, and was obviously concerned about high 
wage claims.
82
  
 
While the immediate function of this quote is to modify and contextualize the meaning of one 
particular analogy to human society in the book, the more general effect is that Dawkins as an 
individual is proven not to hold the political stance that he is seen as representing. Therefore, 
potential readings are restricted, and Dawkins’ personal vote and identity constitute the 
meaning-carrying guarantee. In consequence, the individual person, the author-function and 
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the first-person voice become intertwined, and the author can be said to contribute to his own 
designation.  
Additionally, Dawkins also represents a strong public persona, probably in part due to 
his position as Charles Simonyi Professor for the Public Understanding of Science at Oxford 
University (1995-2008), and the founder of the Richard Dawkins Foundation for Reason and 
Science, and further because of his participation and creation of numerous popular TV-series 
on science, as well as his active role in public debate. As the above examples illustrate, 
Dawkins’ author-function may, then, consist of a myriad of components, all of which 
contributes to what Foucault refers to as “a projection, in more or less psychologizing terms, 
of the operation that we force texts to undergo.”83 The different approaches to Dawkins’ 
author-function, usually supported by quotes and references, underlines what Foucault refers 
to when he describes the proper name as “situated somewhere between description and 
designation.”84 The establishing of the author-function is descriptive in that it is supported by 
reference to other works by Dawkins, and designating in that it is, and must be, selective, 
particularly with regard to the range and variety of Dawkins’s work. 
In my reading, I will try to avoid making a projected author-function the determining 
structural element, as it would imply assigning an intention to the Dawkins of 1976 that was 
not necessarily present. In order to deal with this issue, I will, in my close reading, discuss the 
multiple voices in the book: The narrator, the meta-narrator and the authorial presence. While 
these voices are intertwined, and to some extent overlap, I still find this approach 
constructive, because they can be said to fulfil different functions. Furthermore, a focus on the 
literary elements of the text will allow a reading with a focus on ‘what the text says about 
itself,’ without disregarding the scientific content. The author-function, then, will be Dawkins 
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The Writer, and I will not treat the active first person structuring the book as a direct 
expression of the individual. While I will pay heed to the intention of scientific 
communication, I will not aspire to represent the ‘real’ Dawkins. Rather, my reading 
represents one of several possible readings of The Selfish Gene. In the following, I will 
discuss a selection of readings focusing on different aspects of Dawkins’s book.   
 
 
1.2 Reading The Selfish Gene 
 
 
The “operations that we force texts to undergo, the connections that we make, the traits that 
we establish as pertinent, the continuities that we recognize, or the exclusions that we 
practice”85 are not only derived from the construction of an author-function; they are also a 
consequence of the reader’s perspective. The question is then: are all readings equally valid 
and legitimate? And if not, which readings may be acknowledged as productive and which 
could be dismissed as irrelevant? These questions have been the core of the reception history 
of The Selfish Gene, and in the following I will discuss a selection of very different 
perspectives on the book in order to distinguish some of the problems connected to the issue 
of reading, or more importantly, of misreading.  
 In 1979, Mary Midgley published an article entitled “Gene-Juggling,”86 dealing with 
the philosophical implications of The Selfish Gene. Her critique is based on the philosopher J. 
L. Mackie’s implementation of the selfish gene theory in a philosophical framework. The 
much quoted opening line is concerned with Dawkins’ device of personifying genes: “Genes 
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cannot be selfish or unselfish, any more than atoms can be jealous, elephants abstract or 
biscuits teleological.”87 Midgley’s criticism operates on two levels: on a linguistic level 
dealing with the function of models and metaphors, and on a philosophical level dealing with 
the over-arching normative implication of the metaphor of selfishness. Therefore, the article’s 
perspective has been described as a moral reading. Midgley concentrates “on the moral 
consequences which Dawkins and Mackie draw.”88 Her central point is that Dawkins’ book, 
by dealing with selfishness and altruism, is by definition and inevitably a philosophical work. 
Therefore, she argues, the philosophical and historical context of selfishness may not be 
ignored when it is established as a scientific metaphor.  
  On the level of metaphor, Midgley finds Dawkins’s game-theoretic model, represented 
by the categories of ‘Suckers,’ ‘Cheats’ and ‘Grudgers’ “absurdly abstract,”89 and questions 
the translatability of the model to real, complex life. Central to this criticism is the notion of 
consciousness and intention. The metaphor of gene-selfishness is seen as inadequate as 
explanation of behaviour, because it excludes intention from the scheme. The problem of 
intention starts not with the notion of selfishness, but with its fundament: the notion of 
competition: “In natural selection, many are born but few survive for long. We call this 
‘competition’ and the metaphor at once suggests the specific motive of consciousness.”90 It is 
probably not necessary to note that competition is a well-established technical term in 
biology, but that is also why it is interesting that Midgley acknowledges its metaphoric 
quality. While competition may be seen as a neutral, scientific term, defined by technical use, 
it also has a metaphoric potential which can function as basis for an extended meaning. 
According to Midgley, this potential is the core of Dawkins’ metaphor:  
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It is natural for a reader to suppose that his over-simplified drama about genes is just a 
convenient stylistic device, because it seems obvious that the personification of them 
must just be a metaphor. Indeed he himself sometimes says it is so. But in fact this 
personification, in its literal sense, is essential for his whole contention; without it he is 
bankrupt. His central point is that the emotional nature of man is exclusively self-
interested, and he argues this by claiming that all emotional nature is so.
91
  
 
 In the opening lines of Alan Grafen’s ”The Intellectual Contribution of The Selfish 
Gene to Evolutionary Theory”92 the act of reading is to some extent reflected upon: “A 
phenomenon such as Dawkins’ The Selfish Gene can be seen from many points of view and 
set in many contexts.”93 In spite of their difference in academic disciplines, (Grafen holds a 
professorship in Theoretical Biology and Midgley is professor of Philosophy,) the two 
readings to some extent share a point of departure:  
For my purposes, the core arguments of The Selfish Gene are (i) the introduction of the 
concept of a replicator, which allows what was then the most logically rigorous 
exposition of Darwin’s theory of natural selection (ii) The link between replicator 
selection and selfishness, in a technical sense, and (iii) the suite of links that establish 
in turn each of the then new theoretical ideas in adaptationist biology in terms of the 
selection of replicators.
94
   
   
The focus, particularly in the two first points of Grafen, is indirectly the same in the two texts, 
but the perspectives are fundamentally different. For Midgely, the notion of a replicator is an 
expression of  
the project of finding a unit which will serve for every kind of calculation involved in 
understanding evolution: a ‘fundamental unit’ at a deep level which will displace, and 
not just supplement all serious reference to individuals, groups, kin and species … 
Dawkins is not the only person to be impressed by the idea of a universal unit, but it is 
vacuous.
95
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In Midgley’s reading, the order of events is reversed compared to that of Grafen; the notion of 
selfishness is the main point that The Selfish Gene wants to communicate, and the concept of 
a replicator is only a means of rooting this concept in evolutionary biology: “[Dawkins] wants 
to relate the workings of natural selection in a simple and satisfying way to those of 
motivation by finding a single universal motive, and there is no such motive. Having picked 
on selfishness for this role, he personifies the gene in order to find an owner for it.”96 Midgley 
is concerned with motive as the constitutional element of the metaphor. 
At this point the two texts part: Grafen is concerned only with selfishness in a 
technical sense
97
 i.e. detached from its original meaning which presumes motive. Grafen’s 
notion of gene-selfishness is fundamentally unproblematic:  
Linking selfishness to replicators, he argued that the entity concerned was the gene 
and the quantity that surviving genes would come through natural selection to act as if 
maximizing was their replication. This link between replicator dynamics on the one 
hand and selfishness on the other, brilliantly encompassed in the title of the book, is 
the very centre of Darwin’s argument, but spelled out in a way that is more practical 
for further analysis …98 
     
Selfishness in its technical sense is seen simply as an expression of the mechanism of natural 
selection. In this sense, Grafen’s reading can be seen as an ideal reading, which filters the text 
and draws out only what may be read as objective facts:    
I am convinced that The Selfish Gene brought about a silent and almost immediate 
revolution in biology. The explanations made so much sense, the fundamental 
arguments were so clearly stated and derived so completely from first principles, that 
it was hard to see after reading the book how the world could ever have been any 
different … The very transparency of the exposition tended to make the book itself 
invisible within the newly created conceptual structure.
99
  
 
Grafen recognizes a “transparency of exposition” in the book, diametrically opposed to 
Midgley’s reading. Is the problem, then, that Midgley’s reading is incompatible with a 
                                                          
96
 Ibid 446 
97
 Grafen, “The Intellectual Contribution of The Selfish Gene to Evolutionary Theory” 66 
98
 Ibid 67 
99
  Grafen, “The Intellectual Contribution of The Selfish Gene to Evolutionary Theory” 72 
Nilsen 34 
 
 
scientific perspective simply because the problems it poses are irrelevant? Does she have too 
little knowledge of the first principles of evolution from which the book is derived? Is she 
simply misreading Dawkins’ book and missing the point? The de-complicating reading 
Grafen performs suggests so, and the claim is reinforced by the next article in the anthology, 
by Ullica Segerståle, professor in Sociology: “An Eye On the Core: Dawkins and 
Sociobiology.”100 
Segerstråle sees Dawkins elaboration of the gene’s eye view as a “pedagogical tool for 
understanding such concepts as inclusive fitness and parental investment”101 as well as a 
“heuristic device”102 serving as “conceptual glue”103. It seems then as if a problematization of 
the metaphoric language must be a deliberate attempt of devaluing by now established 
scientific terms; a counter-productive contribution to the battle of the two cultures or the 
Science Wars, and this is indeed how Segerstråle depicts the criticism in her account of this 
kind of reading strategies:  
In relation to ... The Selfish Gene the critics employed a particular reading strategy 
which always yielded results (I have called this ‘moral reading’). The aim was to 
imagine the worst possible social or moral implications of selected sentences in the 
book. These then justified condemnation.
104
   
 
This statement illustrates of the antagonistic tone between the ‘two cultures’, and is a typical 
example of the construction of enemies and straw-targets on both sides that I have discussed 
above. The indignation, however, loses some of its edge when juxtaposed to Segerstråle’s 
account of the theory of gene-level selection:  
This type of population genetic consideration of gene (allele) frequencies within 
populations drew attention away from the group and the individual to a new type of 
gene-selectionist thinking. What emerged was a fundamentally game-theoretical way 
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of approaching behaviour where individuals (affected by their individual genes) 
appeared as strategists, calculating, as it were, the best way to behave in order to 
further their own inclusive fitness.
105
  
 
This is the problem of intention that Midgley distinguishes, although here it functions on the 
level of the individual rather than on the level of the gene. The insertion of the self-conscious 
disclaimer ‘as it were’ illustrates the tension between the metaphorical language of intension 
and the ideal scientific reading.  While the introduction of the paragraph suggests that the 
implied reader is at least somewhat familiar with the scientific jargon of gene-frequencies, 
game-theory and gene-selection, the aspect of motivation is put forward and disclaimed rather 
than simply replaced by a more suitable term: the element of intention is a necessary 
component of depicting the selfish gene theory. We can then draw the part conclusion that 
Midgley’s reflections on the metaphorical quality of the technical language are not necessarily 
irrelevant, even from a scientific perspective.  
This, however, does not solve the fundamental disagreement of The Selfish Gene 
presented in this section of my thesis, and indeed between a range of readings accumulated 
since the mid-twentieth century: the issue of anthropocentrism. Segerstråle’s main concern in 
relation to the critics of (the sociobiological aspects of) Dawkins’ book is this:  
It did not matter to the critics that, unlike Wilson, Dawkins did not try to include 
humans – humans appear in a separate last chapter, where memes (units of culture), 
not genes, are king. The political critics, set on finding fault with the book, blatantly 
ignored Dawkins’ disclaimer that he with his title was describing a new way of 
looking at evolution, not exhorting humans to be selfish. In relation to ... The Selfish 
Gene the critics employed a particular reading strategy which always yielded 
results.
106
    
 
I am now at the core of what some critics see as the fundamental misreading of The Selfish  
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Gene. In a review of Dawkins’ second book The Extended Phenotype from 1982, John 
Maynard Smith
107
 warns of exactly this, what may be seen as an anthropocentric projection to 
the text:  
The Selfish Gene reports no new facts. Nor does it contain any new mathematical 
models – indeed it contains no mathematics at all. What it does offer is a new world 
view. 
Although the book has been widely read and enjoyed, it has also aroused strong 
hostility. Much of this hostility arises, I believe, from misunderstanding, or rather, 
from several misunderstandings. Of these, the most fundamental is a failure to 
understand what the book is about. It is a book about the evolutionary process – it is 
not about morals, or about politics, or about the human sciences. If you are not 
interested in how evolution came about, and cannot conceive how anyone could be 
seriously concerned about anything other than human affairs, then do not read it: it 
will only make you needlessly angry.
108
 
 
In the light of this account it seems that Midgley, by employing ‘a particular reading strategy’ 
has fallen into the trap of getting ‘needlessly angry’ and that her reading does not take into 
consideration that evolution is a natural process happening independently of man. Midgley is 
explicitly concerned with the “moral consequences that Dawkins ... draw[s]”109. Would it then 
have been wiser of Midgley not to have read The Selfish Gene, and keep to the ‘soft 
sciences’? In order to further discuss the issue of anthropocentrism, I will turn to Richard 
Dawkins’s comments of his text in his answer to Mary Midgley’s criticism.  
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1.3 The Writer as Reader and Critic 
 
 
Mary Midgley’s “Gene-Juggling” prompted an answer from Dawkins: “In Defence of Selfish 
Genes.”110 The polemic between the two writers illustrates the antagonistic tone of the debate 
that followed in the wake of the publication of The Selfish Gene. One interesting aspect of 
Dawkins’ reply to Midgley is that the author can be said to perform a reading of his own book 
in order to counter her criticism. This particularly applies to the notion of selfishness, and 
Dawkins quotes a passage from The Selfish Gene in order to clarify the technical use of 
selfishness, i.e. how biologists use the term:  
An entity ... is said to be altruistic if it behaves in such a way as to increase another 
such entity's welfare at the expense of its own. Selfish behaviour has exactly the 
opposite effect. "Welfare" is defined as "chances of survival", even if the effect on 
actual life and death prospects is ... small ... It is important to realize that the above 
definitions of altruism and selfishness are behavioural, not subjective. I am not 
concerned here with the psychology of motives ... that is not what this book is about. 
My definition is concerned only with whether the effect of an act is to lower or raise 
the survival.
111
  
 
This definition coheres with Grafen’s view of ‘selfishness in its technical sense’ as discussed 
above. One question is still: how can the use of a technical term be so problematic for one 
reader, and so clear and unequivocal for another? Midgley is, after all, a philosopher of 
science, and not unfamiliar with words being redefined and used terminologically. This is also 
what becomes clear in her critique of the use of metaphor in science:  
Every metaphor suggests a model; indeed, a model is in itself a metaphor, but one 
which has been carefully pruned. Certain branches of it are safe; others are not and it 
is the first business of somebody who proposes a new model to make this distinction 
clear. Once this is done, the unusable parts of the original metaphor must be sharply 
avoided; it is no longer legitimate to use them simply as stylistic devices.
112
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The unusable parts of the original metaphor are here the connotations of consciousness and 
motivation that are connected to selfishness in its subjective meaning. This seems to concur 
with Dawkins’ technical definition of selfishness: The metaphor of selfishness has been 
purged of motivation and intention. In this sense, selfishness is no longer a metaphor – it has 
become a part of the biological discourse. What, one might ask, then, is the problem? It looks 
as if Midgley has indeed misunderstood the meaning of selfishness as it is used in biological 
discourse, and Dawkins illuminates the misunderstanding:    
Midgley has a lot to say about metaphor, and I can end constructively by explaining 
why it was unnecessary for her to say it. She thought that I would defend my selfish 
genes by claiming that they were intended only as a metaphor, and assumed that I was 
speaking metaphorically when I wrote, 'We are survival machines- robot vehicles 
blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes. This is a truth 
which still fills me with astonishment' (The Selfish Gene, p. ix). But that was no 
metaphor. I believe it is the literal truth, provided certain key words are defined in the 
particular ways favoured by biologists.
113
  
 
Dawkins’s answer disregards the important structural element of personification of genes and 
vehicles. In The Selfish Gene, selfishness is used simultaneously in two different meanings. 
On the one hand, it is used in its technical sense: 
There was a struggle for existence among replicator varieties. They did not know they 
were struggling ... but they were struggling in the sense that any mis-copying that 
resulted in a higher level of stability, or a new way of reducing the stability of rivals, 
was automatically preserved and multiplied.
114
 
 
On the other, it is used metaphorically in the personification of genes and vehicles: 
 
If one parent can get away with investing less than his or her fair share of costly 
resources in each child, however, he will be better off, since he will have more to 
spend on other children by other sexual partners, and so propagate more of his genes. 
Each partner can therefore be thought of as trying to exploit the other, trying to force 
the other one into investing more.
115
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It is, according to Midgley, this juxtaposition of the technical and the colloquial definition of 
selfishness that confuses the meaning. By presenting selfishness as merely a technical term, 
Dawkins avoids Midgley’s critique of the importance of ‘purging the metaphor’. The 
juxtaposition of the technical and the subjective meaning of selfishness potentially makes 
reading The Selfish Gene quite a slippery slope, since it is up to the reader to make out when 
the term is used technically and when it is used metaphorically.  
 This challenge of distinguishing between a technical and metaphorical language is 
only one aspect of a more general problem, the question: What is the central message of The 
Selfish Gene? Midgley defines it like this: “His central point is that the emotional nature of 
man is exclusively self-interested, and he argues this by claiming that all emotional nature is 
so”116. Dawkins’ reply to this is:  
Midgley raises the art of misunderstanding to dizzy heights. My central point had no 
connection with what she alleges. I am not even very directly interested in man, or at 
least not in his emotional nature. My book is about the evolution of life, not the ethics 
of one particular, rather aberrant, species.
117
  
 
Apparently, The Selfish Gene concerns natural phenomena in general of which human is part, 
and not man in particular. I have discussed above how readings of The Selfish Gene differs in 
the approach to man. What I have not as yet touched upon, is Dawkins’ approach to this issue. 
As it appears from the above quote, Dawkins’ pays man only marginal interest. Midgley’s 
misunderstanding, then, would be the act of performing an anthropocentric reading of an 
evolutionary text. This apparent misreading echoes the problems that Darwin faced when the 
Origin was published in 1859. Gillian Beer, in her work Darwin’s Plots observes:  “However 
much Darwin may have represented to himself and his correspondents the absence of man as 
a matter of diplomatic restraint, the exclusion had an immediate polemical effect: it removed 
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man from the centre of attention. An act of will by the reader was required to restore him to 
centrality.”118   
 Similarly, while more explicitly referring to man as a part of a narrative from the 
gene’s eye point of view, Dawkins writes: “We are survival machines, but ‘we’ does not mean 
just people. It embraces all animals, plants bacteria and viruses”119. Here, man is seen as equal 
to any other entity carrying replicators. In a biological context, it might well be prudent to 
treat human simply as body, on equal footing with other bodies. Therefore, it may also be a 
misreading to re-situate man to the centre of attention if this is indeed a narrative of the gene. 
This assumption is apparently supported by the introduction to the last chapter in the first 
edition, dealing with memes:  
So far, I have not talked much about man in particular, though I have not deliberately 
excluded him either. Part of the reason I have used the term ‘survival machines’ is that 
‘animal’ would have left out plants and, in some people’s minds, humans. The 
arguments I have put forth should, prima facie, apply to any evolved being.
120
  
 
Rather than excluding man, like Darwin did, Dawkins explicitly includes him in the 
evolutionary narrative. Implicit in this summary of the central message, is the restriction 
imposed upon the reader not to place man at the centre of attention. One might argue that such 
a restriction is legitimate and even necessary in a popularized text dealing with evolutionary 
biology. However, the question then arises whether the text itself can be said to adhere to the 
restrictions imposed by the narrator, or by the author, by his claim not to be interested in 
man.
121
 I would argue that Dawkins does in fact invite an anthropocentric reading. In the first 
chapter, “Why are People?” a central point of the book is presented:  
My purpose is to examine the biology of selfishness and altruism.  
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Apart from its academic interest, the human importance of this subject is 
obvious. It touches every aspect of our social lives, our loving and hating, fighting and 
cooperating, giving and stealing, our greed and our generosity.
122
   
 
This introductory presentation of the book makes the demand of reading it as an evolutionary 
and not as an anthropological narrative seem unreasonable. This impression is further 
reinforced by statements such as the following: “Let us try to teach generosity and altruism, 
because we are born selfish.”123 In light of these examples, Mary Midgley can hardly be 
accused of ‘raising the art of misunderstanding to dizzy heights’124 when she claims that 
man’s emotional nature is a central point of The Selfish Gene. While, as Beer remarked above, 
an anthropocentric reading of The Origin required an act of will on the part of the reader,
125
 
The Selfish Gene requires an effort on the part of the reader to read man out of the narrative, 
and explicitly so. In the Preface to the 30
th
 Anniversary edition, published in 2006, Dawkins 
responds to criticisms, and reflects upon what he describes as the misunderstandings of the 
concept of selfishness:  
I do with hindsight notice lapses of my own on the very same issues. These are to be 
found especially in Chapter 1, epitomised by the sentence ‘Let us try to teach 
generosity and altruism because we are born selfish’. There is nothing wrong with 
teaching generosity and altruism, but ‘born selfish’ is misleading. In partial 
explanation, it was not until 1978 that I began to think clearly about the distinction 
between ‘vehicles’ (usually organisms) and the ‘replicators’ that ride inside them (in 
practice genes ...). Please mentally delete that rogue sentence and others like it, and 
substitute something along the lines of this paragraph.
126
 
 
The last sentence in this paragraph puts a remarkable responsibility on the reader, while also 
assigning her a submissive role. The reader is expected to read in accordance with an 
underlying message behind the words – the intended meaning – and hence invoke the 
scientifically prudent contents of the text. Moreover, it is not clear what exactly it means to 
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‘mentally delete rogue sentences’. One problem is how a lay-reader is to evaluate whether or 
not a claim or statement is in fact inappropriate in a scientific text. Should she mentally delete 
all claims or statements that may seem ambiguous, and if so, would that not involve checking 
any attempt at critical reading? Again, the juxtaposition of the technical and metaphorical 
meaning of selfishness makes reading hazardous. The plea to mentally delete rogue sentences, 
then, seems to function mainly as a safeguard against criticism, rather than as an illuminating 
modification. If ‘rogue sentences’ are all statements that go beyond the usual object of 
biological research and trespass into the area of philosophy, the plea is to the good-humoured 
reader to be overbearing with the escapades of an overly enthusiastic, young writer who has 
let himself be carried away by the excitement of new ideas. The preface to the second edition 
of The Selfish Gene supports this interpretation:  
I wrote The Selfish Gene in something resembling a fever of excitement.  
When Oxford University Press approached me for a second edition, they 
insisted that a conventional, comprehensive, page by page revision was inappropriate. 
There are some books that, from their conception, are obviously destined for a string 
of editions, and The Selfish Gene was not one of them. The first edition borrowed a 
youthful quality from the times in which it was written. There was a whiff of 
revolution abroad, a streak of Wordsworth’s blissful dawn. A pity to change a child of 
those times, fatten it with new facts or wrinkle it with complications and cautions. So, 
the original text should stand, warts, sexist pronouns and all. Notes at the end would 
cover corrections, responses and developments.
127
  
 
The book, according to Dawkins, has historical value as a testimony of science in progress – 
“a child of those times”. Also, artistic considerations seem to have had an effect on the 
decision not to revise it, or “fatten it with new facts and wrinkle it with complications and 
cautions” – the youthful hubris of a young author writing in “a fever of excitement” should be 
preserved and indulged. In consequence, criticism can be made to look like expressions of 
spitefulness, and unwillingness to read the book sympathetically and in accordance with what 
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is meant. One problem here is, however, that it is not always an easy task to decipher what 
exactly is meant.  
 Dawkins remarks above give the impression that the lack of revision is of minor 
importance. Contrary to this assertion, it is my argument that the end notes, which as well as 
covering “corrections, responses and developments”128 also contain several modifications, 
contribute to complicating the text.  In this web of claims and disclaimers, getting a coherent 
overview requires quite an effort, resulting in the somewhat paradoxical situation that the text 
simultaneously demands a quite sophisticated reading and discourages criticism. The latter is 
of importance with regard to the influence the book has had both in professional circles and 
through its broad readership. When criticism is dismissed and trivialized, the author claims a 
power of definition that I find particularly unfortunate considering the book’s influential 
status. For instance, the notion of selfishness is presented as problematic only because it is 
seen as a misunderstanding or as a failure to understand the book: “Many critics, especially 
vociferous ones learned in philosophy as I have discovered, prefer to read the book by title 
only … I can readily see that The Selfish Gene on its own, without the large footnote of the 
book itself, might give an inadequate impression of its contents”129. However, the book is not 
entirely uncomplicated reading, nor is the concept of selfishness, as becomes clear with the 
notion of poetic science.  
  In his work Unweaving the Rainbow,
130
 first published in 1998, Dawkins introduces 
the concept ‘poetic science’: “It is the central tenet of this book that science, at its best, should 
leave room for poetry. It should note helpful analogies and metaphors that stimulate the 
imagination, conjure in the mind images and allusions that go beyond the needs of 
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straightforward understanding”131. Poetic science, then, is not only a matter of heuristic 
explanation, but may address the reader on a personal level. In the preface to The Blind 
Watchmaker,
132
 Dawkins elaborates this function of poetic science:  
Explaining is a difficult art. You can explain something so that your reader 
understands the words; and you can explain something so that the reader feels it in the 
marrow of his bones. To do the latter, it sometimes isn’t enough to lay the evidence 
before the reader in a dispassionate way. You have to become an advocate and use the 
tricks of the advocate’s trade.133   
 
One quality of poetic science is apparently the ability to appeal to the emotions of the reader: 
to provoke an emotional response. I will explore the consequences of this appeal to the 
subjective consciousness in my close reading in the next chapter of this thesis. The concept of 
poetic science does not, however, only concern the reader and her meeting with the text. It is 
also a matter of language’s influence on the scientific process. In one of his prefaces to The 
Selfish Gene, Dawkins elaborates on the power of metaphor as a scientific tool:  
[I] prefer not to make a clear distinction between science and its ‘popularization’. 
Expounding ideas that have hitherto appeared only in the technical literature is a 
difficult art. It requires insightful new twists of language and revealing metaphors. If 
you push novelty of language and metaphor far enough, you can end up with a new 
way of seeing. And a new way of seeing, as I have just argued, can in its own right 
make an original contribution to science. Einstein himself was no mean popularizer, 
and I have often suspected that his vivid metaphors did more than just help the rest of 
us. Didn’t they also fuel his creative genius?134      
 
Language as a means for inducing new ways of seeing is here considered a creative resource, 
but it may also be seductive:  
But there’s bad poetry as well as good, and bad poetic science can lead the 
imagination along false trails. That danger is the subject of this chapter. By bad poetic 
science I mean something other than incompetent or graceless writing. I am talking 
about almost the opposite: about the power of poetic imagination to inspire bad 
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science, even if it is good poetry, perhaps especially if it is good poetry, for that gives 
the greater power to mislead.
135
  
 
Again, bad poetic science may influence the writer as well as the reader of poetic science. In 
Unweaving the Rainbow, an author is described as “drunk on metaphor”136, while another 
example concerns a group of professional scientists who, Dawkins demonstrates, have been 
misled by bad poetic science and he asks: “If [highly competent professional scientists] can be 
seduced by bad poetic science, what chance has the non-specialist?”137   
In contrast, Dawkins refers to The Selfish Gene, and the concept of selfishness:  
It is now widely understood that altruism at the level of the individual organism can be 
a means by which the underlying genes maximize their self interest … What I would 
now re-emphasize from the book – it has been overlooked by critics who appear to 
have read it by title only – is the important sense in which genes, though in one way 
purely selfish, at the same time enter into cooperative cartels with each other. This is 
poetic science, if you like, but I hope to show that it is good poetic science which aids 
understanding rather than impedes it.
138
    
 
Gene selfishness and genetic agency , within the framework of poetic science, is promoted as 
an illuminating device aiding understanding, both, presumably, as a creative force driving the 
selfish gene theory, and as a means of making scientific knowledge more accessible through 
personification. Furthermore it seems that an understanding of selfish genes requires a deeper 
understanding of the structures of language; selfishness is not an absolute entity. The 
importance of reflexivity towards language’s inherent structures is elaborated in the depiction 
of “one of the most egregious forms of bad poetic science”139:  
I refer to the idea that there is a simple opposition between nasty and nice, social and 
antisocial, selfish and altruistic, tough and gentle; and that these pairs of binary 
oppositions all correspond to other pairs, and that the history of evolutionary 
controversy is described as a pendulum swinging back and forth along a continuum 
between these opposites … I am criticizing the idea that there is a single continuum 
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and that worthwhile arguments are to be had between the vantage points along its 
length.
140
 
 
This observation particularly concerns the tendency of unspecified actors “hijacking nature as 
a source of moral tales.”141 Compared to the logocentric definition that Dawkins applied in his 
reply to Midgley in 1981: “An entity ... is said to be altruistic if it behaves in such a way as to 
increase another such entity's welfare at the expense of its own. Selfish behaviour has exactly 
the opposite effect”142 the development of gene selfishness has come a long way when it is 
written into the terms of poetic science in 1998. Interestingly, the rationale for interpretation 
of selfish genes is now almost the opposite: rather than accepting a univocal, technical 
definition of selfishness, the reader needs to destabilize the dichotomy of selfishness ≠ 
altruism in order to understand how it functions in The Selfish Gene. Ironically, this approach 
concurs with the reading techniques of structural analysis known from deconstructive theory. 
 With the introduction of poetic science, Dawkins can be said to perform literary 
criticism of other works, as well as providing a structural framework from which The Selfish 
Gene should be read. This is not to say that the reader is obligated to adhere to this framework 
– a text may, of course carry meaning beyond that of the author’s intentions. The construction 
of a platform of literary criticism, does, however, indicate the high level of reflexivity in the 
Dawkins’s writings, and opens for other literary approaches to The Selfish Gene.  
In the following chapter, I will examine the function and the effect of the textual 
strategy of personification, as well as the conceptualization of the gene and its narrative 
structure.   
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2: The Language of Convenience and Displaced Agency in The Selfish Gene 
 
 
 
Am I in earnest? Oh dear no! Don’t you know 
that this is a fairy tale, and all fun and pretence; 
and that you are not to believe one word of it, 
even if it is true?
143
 
 
   
Really, universally, relations stop nowhere 
and the exquisite problem of the artist is 
eternally but to draw by a geometry of his 
own, the circle in which they shall happily 
appear to do so.
144
 
 
 
2.1  The Language of Convenience 
 
  
The conflict concerning whether selfishness should be regarded as a technical or metaphorical 
term, as the shown in the debate between Dawkins and Midgley above, originates from the 
fundamental structural device of personification in The Selfish Gene, explicitly described by 
the narrator as the language of convenience: “In practice it is usually convenient, as an 
approximation, to regard the individual body as an agent ‘trying’ to increase the numbers of 
all its genes in future generations. I shall use the language of convenience.”145 This particular 
example refers to the organism, i.e. the body, but the language of convenience is employed on 
several levels, and appears in a variety of forms. The gene may be portrayed as a conscious 
actor: “The lion genes ‘want’ the meat as food for their survival machine. The antelope genes 
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want the meat as working muscle and organs for their survival machine.”146 The metaphorical 
meaning is sometimes, but not always, conveyed by the use of inverted commas. A second 
form of gene-level personification is the depiction of genetic instructions written out in 
English language: “The possessor of an altruistic gene might be recognized simply by the fact 
that he does altruistic acts. A gene could prosper in the gene pool if it ‘said’ the equivalent of: 
‘Body, if A is drowning as a result of trying to save someone else from drowning, jump in and 
rescue A.”147 The language of convenience is also applied to individual bodies, i.e. survival 
machines, either in the form of inherent intention: “Ideally, what an individual would ‘like’ (I 
don’t mean physically enjoy, although he might) would be to copulate with as many members 
of the opposite sex as possible, leaving the partner in each case to bring up the children,”148 or 
written out in what the narrator refers to as soliloquy:  
If I start a fight, I am just as likely to end up dead as he is. Perhaps even more so. He 
holds a valuable resource, that is why I want to fight him. But why does he hold it? 
Perhaps he won it in combat. He has probably beaten of other challengers before me. 
He is probably a good fighter. Even if I win the fight and gain the harem, I may be so 
badly mauled in the process that I cannot enjoy the benefits. Also, fighting uses up 
time and energy.
149
   
 
The soliloquy contributes to the literary, readable style, and emphasises the portrayal of 
evolution as a drama taking place in nature. In this sense, the language of convenience serves 
a stylistic purpose: “At times, gene language gets a bit tedious, and for brevity and vividness 
we shall lapse into metaphor.”150 Brevity and vividness can be distinguished as genre features 
of the genre of popular, or public, science. The stylistic effect is, however, only one of a 
variety of functions that the language of convenience fills. One significant function is that of 
substituting for mathematical calculation, particularly with regard to evolutionarily stable 
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strategies (ESS), which is the central tenet of the book: “This subjective soliloquy is just a 
way of pointing out that the decision whether or not to fight should ideally be preceded by a 
complex, if unconscious ‘cost-benefit’ calculation.”151 The metaphor of personification, 
according to the preface to the 30
th
 Anniversary Edition functions as “verbal equivalents of 
mathematical calculations”152: 
When a man throws a ball high in the air and catches it again he behaves as if he had 
solved a set of differential equations in predicting the trajectory of the ball. He may 
never know or care what a differential equation is, but this does not affect his skill 
with the ball. At some subconscious level, something functionally equivalent to the 
mathematical calculations is going on.
153
  
 
The mathematical calculations that the language of convenience represents, then, take place 
independently of intension, consciousness and mathematical abilities: In order to catch the 
ball, the man must predict how the ball is going to move and where it is going to land, an 
unconscious prediction which is equivalent to that of mathematical calculation. Hence, the 
language of convenience may be regarded as technical terminology, calling for a purely 
scientific reading such as that of Grafen in 2.2 in this thesis.  The fundamental difference 
between mathematical calculation and its verbal equivalent is that the verbal expression 
requires a grammatical agent. Gillian Beer, in her book Darwin’s Plots, distinguishes some 
fundamental problems of writing out the faceless event of evolution in language:  “First, 
language is anthropocentric. It places man at the centre of signification ... Second, language 
always includes agency, and agency and intention are frequently impossible to distinguish in 
language.”154 I will discuss the latter problem first: Language is always imbued with intention, 
and this is a problem that must be tackled by the writer of evolutionary history. Whereas the 
dominant grammatical agent of The Origin is natural selection, well established in today’s 
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evolutionary discourse, the agent of The Selfish Gene is at times the survival machine, and at 
times the gene, but it is the gene that is the protagonist of the drama, and it is always the 
implicit agent, for reasons that will become clear further down in this chapter. While Darwin, 
through numerous editions of The Origin, struggled to wrest will and intention out of the 
language of evolution and thus to “write against the grain of language,”155 the language of 
convenience makes will and intention the driving force of the argumentation of The Selfish 
Gene. The intention-imbued language can be said to render the representation more 
Lamarckian than Darwinian.  
Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1744-1829) is famously known for proposing that the giraffe’s 
neck was made longer through generations by its constant stretching to reach the top leaves as 
the environment changed and trees grew taller.
156
 As Beer observes:  
Intention is the key to Lamarck’s concepts, and [he] proposes a world of intelligent 
desire rationally satisfied ...  It gave primacy to the mind – to intention, habit, memory, 
a reasoned inheritance from generation to generation in which need engendered 
solution and solution could be genetically preserved by means of an act of will, 
rendered independent of consciousness as habit.
157
 
  
Intention features as an instrument of representation in The Selfish Gene, consequentially re-
introducing intention to the technical term of selfishness. Instead of purging language of its 
metaphorical quality, a reflexive narrator steps in and modifies the notion of conscious 
intention: “It is important to realize that we are not thinking of the strategy as being 
consciously worked out by the individual. Remember that we are picturing the body as a robot 
survival machine with a pre-programmed computer controlling the muscles.”158 Thus, the 
reader’s attention is drawn to the metaphoric quality of the language of convenience: “At 
times, gene language gets a bit tedious, and for brevity and vividness we shall lapse into 
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metaphor. But we shall always keep a sceptical eye on our metaphors, to make sure they can 
be translated back into gene language if necessary.”159 Hence, the reader is put in the peculiar 
position of accepting the appeal to the rational consciousness, all the while dismissing the 
same notion. In this sense, one might say that the reader is held responsible for purging or 
purifying the meaning of the metaphor, rather than the text working to free itself from the 
connotation of intention. Because the as-if calculation is written out as personification rather 
than in terms of similes, the hypothetical quality of ‘as if’ is implied rather than explicitly 
worked into the language – as in the example of the man with the ball. As a result, the text 
requires a doubleness of reading – a plea to the reader to read against the grain of language, 
thus liberating the writer from the struggles with language. Gene language – the language 
which the metaphorical language of convenience represents – is at times invoked: “I have 
made the simplifying assumption that the individual animal works out what is best for its 
genes. What really happens is that the gene pool becomes filled with genes that influence 
bodies in such a way that they behave as if they had made these calculations.”160 Here the 
gene is the grammatical agent, but not a conscious actor. The effect of the language of 
convenience, particularly when juxtaposed to gene language, is that it induces a suspension of 
disbelief on the part of the reader. The willed suspension of disbelief and the readiness to 
enter into the imaginative sphere of representation is consolidated by the reassuring narrator:  
But of course we do not have to think of the animals as making calculations 
consciously. All we have to believe is that those individuals whose genes build brains 
in such a way that they tend to gamble correctly are as a direct result more likely to 
survive, and therefore to propagate those same genes.
161
 
 
The doubleness of accepting and not accepting the language of convenience, along with the 
willed suspension of disbelief, requires on the one hand a somewhat sympathetic reading. 
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Moreover, it engages the reader in an imaginative reading which is usually associated with 
fiction rather than scientific works. Rather than being concerned with natural events taking 
place outside of language, the reader becomes engaged in an imaginative reading, which in 
turn opens for a subjective experience in the encounter with the text.  
This brings me to the other challenge that Beer distinguishes in writing out 
evolutionary history: that language is anthropocentric. In 1.3 above, I claimed that, in contrast 
to the readers of The Origin, the reader of The Selfish Gene must make an effort to read man 
out of the narrative, and that Dawkins’s mode of writing invites an anthropocentric reading. 
Rather than refusing the anthropocentric connotations of language, the language of 
convenience makes use of these connotations: “Since you and I are humans who know what it 
is like to have conscious purposes, it is convenient for me to use the language of purpose as a 
metaphor in explaining the behaviour of survival machines”162 – the anthropocentric language 
serves the purpose of recognition and identification, and the narrator muses on the 
anthropocentric tendencies of man:  
When we watch an animal ‘searching’ for food, or for a mate, or for a lost child, we 
can hardly help imputing to it some of the subjective feelings that we ourselves 
experience when we search. These may include ‘desire’ for some object, a ‘mental 
picture’ of the desired object, an ‘aim’ or ‘end in view’. Each one of us knows, from 
the evidence of our own introspection, that, at least in our modern survival machine, 
this purposiveness has evolved the property we call ‘consciousnesses’. I am not 
philosopher enough to discuss what this means, but fortunately, it does not matter for 
our present purposes because it is easy to talk about machines as if motivated by a 
purpose, and to leave open the question whether they actually are conscious.
163
 
 
The as-if constructions make it possible, as does the motivating aspect of rational intention in 
Lamarck, to make language independent of consciousness while drawing on the tendency of 
man to project intention and identification onto our surroundings, and thus open for an 
intuitive understanding of natural processes. Importantly, the technical function of translating 
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mathematical calculations is juxtaposed and intertwined with the function of making possible 
an intuitive understanding. Opening the door to human psychology, the intuitive 
understanding gains an uncanny quality when the language of convenience is projected back 
to man from the point of view of the gene: “’Here is a list of things defined as rewarding: 
sweet taste in the mouth, orgasm, mild temperature, smiling child. And here is a list of nasty 
things: various sorts of pain, nausea, empty stomach, screaming child’.”164 All of the 
examples address emotions, the Not-Thought – taste, orgasm and pain cannot be verbalized 
other than in terms of personal experience, and hence, the scientific book moves into the 
domain of the subjective. The uncanny effect makes itself even more strongly felt when 
juxtaposed to the detached, disinterested function of ideal calculations: “This subjective 
soliloquy is just a way of pointing out that the decision whether or not to fight should ideally 
be preceded by a complex, if unconscious ‘cost-benefit’ calculation.”165 The language of 
convenience as a technical device is, as I have demonstrated, intertwined with the uncanny 
effect of identification, also when it is used as verbal expression of genetic information, in the 
form of instructions posed by the gene to the brain. In order to further investigate the effects 
of this structure, I will in the following turn to the conceptualization of the gene in The Selfish 
Gene, and its scientific implications.  
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2.2. Poetic Science and the Conceptualization of the Gene 
 
 
The gene’s eye point of view does not originate from Dawkins:  
The gene’s eye view of Darwinism is implicit in the writings of R. A. Fisher 
and the other great pioneers of Neo-Darwinism in the early thirties, but was made 
explicit by W. D. Hamilton and G. C. Williams in the sixties.
166
  
 
 However, as Dawkins develops the notion of selfish genes, he invokes a particular definition, 
based on abstraction:  
I am using the word gene to mean a genetic unit that is small enough to last for a large 
number of generations and to be distributed around in the form of many copies. This is 
not a rigid all-or-nothing definition, but a kind of fading-out-definition, like the 
definition of ‘big’ or ’old’. The more likely a length of chromosome is to be split by 
crossing-over, or altered by mutations of various kinds, the less it qualifies to be called 
a gene in the sense in which I am using them.
167
  
 
Hence, the selfish gene does not refer to a specific material object, but rather to a stable set of 
molecules. This definition does not represent the geneticist definition of a gene, because it is 
concerned with its copying-ability rather than its composition. The problem is sometimes 
avoided by the term ‘replicator’, which is used interchangeably with that of ‘gene’, and the 
gene definition is referred to as a “unity of convenience”168 – a construction upon which the 
theory can be developed. The liberty of definition makes possible a “new way of seeing,”169 
which in turn is a requirement for ‘good poetic science’170  
 
My definition will not be to everyone’s taste, but there is no universally agreed 
definition of a gene. Even if there were, there is nothing sacred about definitions. We 
can define a word how we like for our own purposes, provided we do so clearly and 
unambiguously.
171
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The selective but ‘clear and unambiguous’ definition furthermore fulfils the requirement of 
poetic science to clarify and illuminate rather than to confuse the issue. Kim Sterelny 
comments on the effectiveness of the gene-conceptualization: “The molecular biology of 
genes – the chemical details of their action, interaction and reproduction – is alarmingly 
complex. But fortunately, Dawkins does not allow himself to be bogged down in these details, 
and we can follow his lead.”172 Rather than spending time and space on genetic definition, the 
book can go straight to its real issue of genetic effects:  
On any sensible view of the matter, Darwinian selection does not work on genes 
directly. DNA is cocooned in the protein, swaddled in membranes, shielded from the 
world and invisible to natural selection. If selection tried to choose DNA molecules 
directly it would hardly find any criterion by which to do so. All genes look alike, just 
as all recording tapes look alike. The important differences between genes emerge 
only in their effects.
173
   
 
The analogy of recording tapes illustrates the conception of information. Treating DNA as 
information is a scientific convention:  
 
DNA can be regarded as a set of instructions for how to make a body, written in the A, 
T, C, G, alphabet of the nucleotides … The coded message of the DNA, written in the 
four letter nucleotide alphabet, is translated in a simple mechanical way into another 
alphabet. This is the alphabet of amino acids which spells out protein molecules.
174
  
 
James R. Griesemer, in his article “The Informational Gene and the Substantial Body: On the   
Generalization of Evolutionary Theory by Abstraction”175 writes: “Information provided a 
useful interpretive frame for working out aspects of the genetic code in the 1960s (at the dawn 
of the ‘information age’).”176 The conceptualization of genes as information, too, can be read 
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into Dawkins’ notion of poetic science, where abstraction and the invention of new concepts 
provide a productive framework for further research.  
 In The Selfish Gene the convention of DNA as information is taken to its literal 
extreme with the language of convenience:    
It is important to realize that we are not thinking of the strategy as being consciously 
worked out by the individual. Remember that we are picturing the body as a robot 
survival machine with a pre-programmed computer controlling the muscles. To write 
out a set of simple instructions in English is just a convenient way for us to think about 
it. By some unspecified mechanism, the animal behaves as if he were following these 
instructions.
177
 
 
The ‘set of simple instructions’ is rooted in the alphabet of DNA, and translated into the 
alphabet of amino acids. In this sense, the gene-instructions could be seen as verbal 
expression of the coded messages, much in the same sense as the as if personification is 
treated as a verbal equivalent of mathematical calculations. While this structural device is 
effective in communicating the central idea of gene-level selection, and provides its rationale, 
the information concept also has a reciprocal effect on the gene-concept:  
the more seriously one takes information, the more likely one is to deny that evolution 
happens at any level other than that of the gene. If one takes information too seriously, 
it can even come to replace the molecular concept of the gene altogether. The result is 
a theory that genes are evolutionary information.
178
  
 
One might argue that the notion of gene as information is legitimate for biological 
purposes, which are not concerned with the genotypic composition, but with its effect – the 
physical realization of the genotype, i.e. the phenotype, as explained in a research paper 
published in 2004: “The purpose of the evolutionary gene concept is to abstract away from the 
complexities of the gene-phenotype relationship.”179 Rheinberger and Müller-Wille in the 
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article “Gene”180 explain the motivation for the biological conceptualization of the gene: the 
“evolutionary gene had to result in or had to be correlated with some phenotypic difference 
that could be “seen” or targeted by selection.”181 The phenotypic difference that The Selfish 
Gene is concerned with is mainly behaviour. The verbalized gene instructions make possible 
the portrayal of a linear transition of genetic information resulting in a specific behaviour. 
However, the notion of translating the genetic event into verbal language is not 
unproblematic: “the ability to describe changes in the composition of the genome after the 
fact is not the same as the ability to explain or predict those changes.”182 The language of 
convenience, then, anticipates the genetic event, and functions as a post-rationalization of the 
phenotype as automatic realization of the genotype. This reversal of interpretation: phenotype 
as evidence for genome rather than genetic changes linked to changes in phenotype is evident 
in statements like: “The possessor of an altruistic gene might be recognized simply by the fact 
that he does altruistic acts.”183  
 Dawkins has been accused of advocating a deterministic approach to genetic biology. 
In light of the gene conception and the genotype-phenotype relationship, this seems 
understandable; if all behaviour is by definition expressions of genetic manipulation, then 
genes do indeed determine all aspects of life, also human, and the notion of free will is an 
illusion. Within this paradigm, gene selfishness would inescapably imply that all behaviour, 
including the human, were selfish. The deterministic approach is, however, refuted in a note 
to the second edition of The Selfish Gene:  
[Some critics], perhaps because they read the book by title only or never made it past 
the first two pages, have thought that I was saying that, whether we like it or not, 
selfishness and other nasty ways are an inescapable part of our nature. This error is 
easy to fall into if you think, as many people unaccountably seem to, that genetic 
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‘determination’ is for keeps – absolute and irreversible. In fact genes ‘determine’ 
behaviour only in a statistical sense … We don’t see red sunsets as irrevocably 
determining fine weather the next day, and no more should we think of genes as 
irrevocably determining anything. There is no reason why the influence of genes 
cannot easily be reversed by other influences.
184
   
 
In order to take this modification of the selfish gene theory into consideration, the reader must 
(in addition to deleting the ‘rogue sentences’ discussed in 1.3 in this thesis) apply a reading in 
terms of poetic science, or even in terms of ‘science fiction’. To read this aspect of the book 
as poetic science would be to emphasize the hypothetical nature of the theory, and to 
acknowledge it only as a potential and more or less probable truth. The statement “the 
possessor of an altruistic gene might be recognized simply by the fact that he does altruistic 
acts”185 would then be true only within the imaginary universe of the text. As mentioned, the 
gene’s eye point of view does not originate from Dawkins, but it is in The Selfish Gene that 
the gene’s eye point of view is played out and “in the process Dawkins’ heuristic device 
becomes a conceptual glue for keeping the core ideas of sociobiology together.”186 How, then, 
is this conceptual glue structured, and to what effect? In the following, I will discuss the 
narrative structure of the story of selfish genes.  
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2.3  The Narrative of Nature 
 
 
Katherine N. Hayles observes that “Dawkins, a skilful rhetorician keenly aware of the value 
of a good story, nevertheless espouses what might be called the giftwrap model of language,”  
which “claims it is merely a wrapper for what lies within,”187 an observation that to some 
extent coheres with the scientific readings discussed in 1.2 in this thesis. From this starting 
point, Hayles establishes its function. It is “much more than attractive giftwrap. On the 
contrary, it is central to the constitution of a narrative in which the gene is cast as protagonist 
... The entire argument depends on the narrative in which the selfish gene, far from being a 
mere rhetorical flourish, is the constitutive actor.”188  Hence, the structure in this case is closer 
to what Myers ‘narrative of nature’, a typical feature of popular science. As an illuminating 
contrast, I will again turn to Beer and her analysis of the evolutionary narrative in Darwin’s 
the Origin:  
The narrative time of the Origin is not one that begins at the beginning, but 
rather in the moment of observation. The first words are: ‘When we look’ and the first 
two chapters are concerned with variation: under domestication and under nature. The 
ordering reinforces the argument. It suggests two crucial insights. 
Originating is an activity, not an authority. And deviation, not truth to type is 
the creative principle.
189
  
 
How does the ordering of The Selfish Gene reinforce the argument? Whereas The Origin 
begins at the moment of observation: ‘When we look,’ the narrative of the gene begins at the 
beginning: 
I shall argue that the fundamental unit of selection, and therefore, of self-interest, is 
not the species, nor the group, nor even, strictly, the individual. It is the gene, the unit 
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if heredity. The argument takes time to develop, and we must begin with the 
beginning, with the very origin of life itself.
190
 
  
The origin of life, as the narrator acknowledges, is to some extent imaginative:  
 
The account of the origin of life that I shall give is necessarily speculative; by 
definition, nobody was around to see what happened. There are a number of rival 
theories, but they all have certain features in common. The simplified account I shall 
now give is probably not too far from the truth.
191
  
 
Sterelny, in his account for the selfish gene theory, describes the opening of the narrative like 
this:  
The Selfish Gene begins with a creation myth. Dawkins asks us to imagine a primitive, 
pre-biotic world – a world in which physical and biochemical processes make 
available a soup of chemical and physical resources. In this soup, nothing lives, 
nothing dies and nothing evolves. But then Something Happens. A replicator, by 
chance, comes into existence. A replicator is a molecule (or any other structure) that in 
the right environment acts as a template for its own copying.
192
  
 
The chosen, hypothetical beginning is not depicted as fact, but as a structural device – an 
organizing principle. This aspect is emphasized in the end notes to the second edition:  
There are many theories of the origin of life. Rather than labour through them, in The 
Selfish Gene I chose just one to illustrate the main idea. But I wouldn’t wish to give 
the impression that this was the only serious candidate, or even the best one. Indeed, in 
The Blind Watchmaker, I deliberately chose a different one for the same purpose ... In 
neither book did I commit myself to the particular hypothesis chosen ...
193
   
   
The Beginning, then, is not established as a scientific fact as such, but as a convenient 
foundation on which to develop the argument and the genetic narrative. The focus on the 
beginning as a matter of choice, as arbitrary and inherently hypothetical, gives the impression 
that it is over-all irrelevant where and how the narrative begins, except insofar as it represents 
a beginning. The narrative of the gene contributes to the establishment of “a conceptual glue,” 
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in the words of Segerstråle as presented in 1.2 above. But to which extent does the beginning 
influence the narrative throughout?   
On the one hand, the construction of a Beginning makes possible the captivating 
narrative and what the narrator refers to as “purple passages”194 which characterize the style 
of the book, and also adds to its readability:  
As the cistrons leave one body and enter the next, as they board sperm or egg for the 
journey into the next generation, they are likely to find that the little vessel contains 
their close neighbours of the previous voyage, old shipmates with whom they sailed on 
the long odyssey from the bodies of distant ancestors.
195
  
 
The narrativity not only renders the text readable, and gives an impression of ‘storytelling’ 
making the scientific fact interesting to the lay-reader, it also conveys a normative perspective 
on evolutionary theory:   
The next important link in the argument, one that Darwin himself laid stress on 
(although he was talking about animals and plants, not molecules) is competition ... 
In our picture of the replicator acting as a template or mould, we supposed it to be 
bathed in a soup rich in the small building block molecules necessary to make copies. 
But when the replicators became numerous, building blocks must have been used up at 
such a rate that they became a scarce and precious resource. Different varieties or 
strains of replicator must have competed for them ... There was a struggle for existence 
among replicator varieties. They did not know they were struggling, or worry about it 
…. The process of improvement was cumulative. Ways of increasing stability and of 
decreasing rivals’ stability became more elaborate and more efficient. Some of them 
may even have ‘discovered’ how to break up molecules of rival varieties chemically, 
and to use the building blocks so released for making their own copies. These proto-
carnivores simultaneously obtained food and removed competing rivals. Other 
replicators perhaps discovered how to protect themselves, either chemically, or by 
building a physical wall of protein around themselves. This may have been how the 
first living cells appeared. Replicators began not merely to exist, but to construct for 
themselves containers, vehicles for their continued existence. The replicators that 
survived were the ones that built survival machines for themselves to live in. The first 
survival machines probably consisted of nothing more than a protective coat. But 
making a living got steadily harder as new arrivals arose with better and more 
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effective survival machines. Survival machines got bigger and more elaborate, and the 
process was cumulative and progressive.
196
  
 
The notion of a cumulative and progressive process suggests a rationally satisfying linear 
movement towards the present, as well as continuous improvement and progress. The passage 
opens with a reference to Darwin, rooting the theory in the founder of evolutionary 
discursivity, and establishing the selfish gene theory as a mere extension of the original 
evolutionary theory, followed by a reminder of the hypothetical nature of the creation myth: 
‘In our picture of ...’, ‘we supposed ...’. The hypothetical nature of the narrative beginning is 
simultaneously maintained and given realism on the basis of logical necessity with the 
subsequent turn: ‘Different varieties or strains of replicator must have competed for them’. 
Then, the scientific enquiry takes over with ‘may have’ and ‘perhaps’, before the paragraph is 
brought home with the affirmative indicative: ‘Replicators began not merely to exist, but to 
construct for themselves containers, vehicles for their continued existence ... Survival 
machines got bigger and more elaborate, and the process was cumulative and progressive’. 
The structure of this paragraph to some extent mirrors the structure of the book, skipping back 
and forth between the hypothetical and the factual.   
 The beginning of the narrative furthermore makes possible the portrayal of the 
replicator as stable and eternal – notwithstanding a modification also to this point: “For 
simplicity I have given the impression that modern genes, made of DNA are much the same 
as the first replicators in the primeval soup. It does not matter for the argument, but this may 
not really be true.”197 It does however, matter for the force of the argument, as is evident from 
the subsequent portrayal of the replicator:  
As far as the gene is concerned, the gene pool is just the new sort of soup where it 
makes its living. All that has changed is that nowadays it makes its living by 
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cooperating with successive groups of companions drawn from the gene pool in 
building one mortal survival machine after the other. 
198
 
 
Thus the competitive rules of the ancient molecules in primeval soup can then be transposed 
to modern DNA, through the gene’s eye point of view, and the image of the protagonist 
replicator is rendered vivid and clear, in accordance with Dawkins’s definition of ‘good poetic 
science’. The vividness of the image is further sustained by ironic statements like “What shall 
it profit a male if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his immortal genes?”199 where the 
biblical reference indicates that the concept provides a raison d’être for all life. Whereas the 
structure of the Origin, according to Beer, expresses the insight that “originating is an activity, 
not an authority,” and “deviation, not truth to type is the creative principle,”200 the creative 
principle of The Selfish Gene seems to be the opposite; while genetic mutations cause 
evolution, the replicator itself is a stabilizing force of the narrative. In consequence, 
originating becomes the authority which provides the conditions for further development. By 
the time we reach the last chapter of the 1976 edition, entitled, “Memes: the New 
Replicators,” the hypothetical outset of the creation myth has become more forcefully 
established. The meme, a term coined by Dawkins,
201
 is depicted as the cultural equivalent to 
the gene: the replicator of cultural evolution. Memes are for example “tunes, ideas, catch-
phrases, clothes-fashion, ways of making pots or of building arches.”202  Interestingly, the 
meme-theory was not, according to Dawkins, designed in order to explain cultural 
development, but rather to “claim almost limitless power for slightly inaccurate self-
replicating entities, once they arise anywhere in the universe.”203 When the gene is depicted as 
                                                          
198
 Ibid 45 
199
 Ibid 162 
200
 Beer Darwin’s Plots 59 
201
 The Selfish Gene 192 
202
 Ibid 
203
 Ibid 322 
Nilsen 64 
 
 
analogous to memes, it has the effect of rooting the abstraction of the gene as a solid 
foundation upon which the abstraction of the meme rests.  
 [The meme] is still in its infancy, still drifting clumsily around in its primeval soup, 
but already it is achieving evolutionary change at a rate that leaves the old gene 
panting far behind.  
The new soup is the soup of human culture. We need a name for the new 
replicator ...
204
   
 
What happens here is a type of abstraction upon abstraction, which renders the first 
abstraction almost material by comparison. Also evident in the above quote is the notion of 
evolution as progress and improvement:   
As soon as the primeval soup provided conditions in which molecules could make 
copies of themselves, the replicators themselves took over. For more than three 
thousand million years, DNA has been the only replicator worth talking about in the 
world. But it does not necessarily hold these monopoly rights for a long time. 
Whenever conditions arise in which a new kind of replicator can make copies of itself, 
the new replicators will tend to take over, and start a new kind of evolution of their 
own. Once this new evolution begins, it will in no necessary sense be subservient to 
the old. The old gene selected evolution, by making brains, provided the soup in which 
the first memes arose.
205
 
 
The new replicators ‘take over’ and, abstract and hypothetical though they may be, constitute 
the ideal replicator: one that not only ‘is’ information, but one that is information. But, in 
order for the analogy to stick, there must be competition and subsequent selfishness: 
Let us pursue the analogy between genes and memes further ... In both cases the idea 
of purpose is only a metaphor, but we have already seen what a fruitful metaphor it is 
in the case of the genes. We have even used words like ‘selfish’ and ‘ruthless’ of 
genes, knowing full well it is only a figure of speech. Can we, in the exact same spirit, 
look for selfish or ruthless memes?
206
   
 
Competition does seem to take place, and the battlefields for rival memes are “radio and 
television time, billboard space, newspaper column-inches and library shelf-space”207 where 
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they compete for space in the relatively small scope of the human brain. As in the origin of 
replicators, the emergence of selfishness is rationally rooted in the notion of competition that 
appeared as a result of scarcity of resource. Hayles paraphrases Evelyn Fox Keller on the 
notion of competition: 
Keller notes that competition has traditionally been linked with scarcity. Embedded 
within the coupling of scarcity and competition, she argues, lies a series of nested 
assumptions that inscript into biology the discourses of the liberal subject, in which 
competition for scarce resources is played off the Lockean (sic) premise that man, first 
and foremost, has the right to own himself. From this limited resource, a man through 
his labour creates other recourses in a competitive environment that rewards 
investment and punishes dissipation.
208
 
 
In the creation myth of the origin of life, the gene is established as the subject of the narrative. 
The premise of competition is coupled with scarcity, rendering the genetic protagonist a 
liberal subject, providing the rationale of the selfish gene theory, which is given universal 
value by extension. The meme theory illustrates the power of analogy, and the effect of 
abstraction. Less elegant, and therefore less convincing, is the depiction of memes presented 
by David Haig in his essay “The Gene Meme”209: “I have crafted phrases to grab your 
attention, and have worked, and reworked, on clarifying concepts in my own mind ... The 
final version contains the ideas that have grabbed my attention. It has sometimes seemed like 
they were using me for their own ends.”210 Despite of the lack of rhetorical elegance, the 
technique is somewhat similar; the reader recognizes the idiom , and the recognition confirms 
the idea on an abstract level – the meme as agent, using the brain ‘for its own ends’ – the 
replicator replaces the body as agent in the evolutionary narrative. Hayles notes that  
The Selfish Gene is underwritten by two imperatives: preserving the autonomous 
agency characteristic of the liberal subject, and relocating it in the non-conscious 
modular units of the genes. These moves carry a double valence of anxiety and 
reassurance. Even though one’s own agency is co-opted, agency itself is preserved.211  
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In light of 2.1 above, we could treat the Lamarckian language as an aspect of ‘reassurance’ 
factor, rendering the evolutionary process graspable and in accordance with human 
understanding. In order to take a closer look at the aspect of ‘anxiety of co-opted agency’ that 
Hayles emphasises, I will in the following turn to the survival machine and its structuring in 
The Selfish Gene.     
 
 
2.4 The Structural Function and Uncanny Effect of the Survival Machine 
 
 
Chapter Thirteen of The Selfish Gene, added to the second edition, opens with the following 
paragraph:  
An uneasy tension disturbs the heart of the selfish gene theory. It is the tension 
between gene and individual body as fundamental agent of life. On the one hand we 
have the beguiling image of independent DNA replicators, skipping like chamois, free 
and untrammelled down the generations, temporarily brought together in throwaway 
survival machines, immortal coils shuffling off an endless succession of mortal ones 
as they forge towards their separate entities. On the other hand we look at the 
individual bodies themselves and each one is obviously a coherent, integrated, 
immensely complicated machine, with a conspicuous unity of purpose.
212
 
 
The replicator as ‘chamois’ stand in striking contrast to the ‘throwaway survival machines’. In 
addition to depicting the body as mechanic and restricted, while the gene represent wild and 
free Nature, the passage illustrates how the immortality of the gene is counterpoised to the 
temporary body. In this respect the survival machine confirms the notion of the eternal 
replicator – it is a necessary structural element:    
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Individuals are not stable things, they are fleeting. Chromosomes too are shuffled into 
oblivion, like hands of cards soon after they are dealt. But the cards themselves 
survive the shuffling. The cards are the genes. The genes are not destroyed by 
crossing-over, they merely change partners and march on. Of course they march on. 
That is their business. They are the replicators and we their survival machines. When 
we have served our purpose we are cast aside. But genes are denizens of geological 
time: genes are forever.
213
    
 
The transitory body represents the instability against which the notion  of the continuity of the 
gene is reinforced. The immortality of the gene is an important aspect in constituting the gene 
as a stable force. By contrasting the continuity of the gene with the fleeting individual, its 
subordinate status is made manifest, and the rationale for gene agency is firmly established. 
The uncanny effect of this dichotomy of fleeting ≠ stable becomes pressing when linked to 
subjective experience:     
Another aspect of the particulateness of the gene is that is does not grow senile; it is no 
more likely to die when it is a million years old than when it is only a hundred. It leaps 
from body to body down the generations, manipulating body after body in its own way 
and for its own ends, abandoning a succession of mortal bodies before they sink into 
senility and death.
214
       
 
Again, personal recognition is an essential precondition for understanding, and the selfish 
gene theory becomes a part of human understanding of the self. Not only does the body 
represent the fleeting contrast to the stable gene, it also represents the compound contrast to 
the particular, or singular, gene; with the modification that the gene, in fact is not a unit, but 
represents a unit: 
Colonies of genes they may be but, in their behaviour, bodies have undeniably 
acquired an individuality of their own. An animal moves as a coordinated whole, as a 
unit. Subjectively I feel like a unit, not a colony. This is to be expected. Selection has 
favoured genes that cooperate with others. In the fierce competition for scarce 
resources, in the relentless struggle to eat other survival machines, and to avoid being 
eaten, there must have been a premium on central coordination rather than anarchy 
within the communal body. Nowadays the intricate mutual co-evolution of genes has 
proceeded to such an extent that the communal nature of the individual machine is 
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virtually unrecognizable. Indeed many biologists do not recognize it, and will disagree 
with me.
215
   
     
The human consciousness experiences the body as a whole, and therefore does not 
acknowledge its communal nature. While the body as a complex in a biological or medical 
context is not necessarily an uncanny prospect, the personal observation that ‘Subjectively I 
feel like a unit,’ renders consciousness as marginal, misleading, not to be trusted. The notion 
of the survival machine is presented like this: “We are survival machines, but ’we’ does not 
mean just people. It embraces all animals, plants, bacteria and viruses.”216 In the story of the 
gene, the body merely represents environment, and there is no reason to distinguish a human 
body from any other forms of environment which consists of molecules. In this context, 
consciousness has no place, and is actually so remote as to be reinserted as a heuristic device 
in depicting the mechanical processes of evolution. Thus, ‘survival machine’ may be said to 
be purged of its metaphorical meaning and used “in the particular way favoured by 
biologists.”217 At times, the particular meaning of the survival machine is explicitly referred 
to: “Remember that we are picturing the body as a robot survival machine with a pre-
programmed computer controlling the muscles.”218 The image is explicitly created as a means 
to a specific end, and the pre-programmed computer is the brain:  
Brains may be regarded as analogous in function to computers. They are analogous in 
that both types of machine generate complex patterns of output, after analysis of 
complete patterns of input, and after reference of stored information ... The main way 
in which brains actually contribute to the success of the survival machine is by 
controlling and coordinating the contractions of muscles. To do this they need cables 
leading to the muscles, and these are called motor nerves.
219
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The brain as controlling the nervous system, as in the example of a man throwing a ball and 
unconsciously performing mathematical calculations, correlates to the analogy of the brain as 
computer.  By extension, the gene controls the brain, which is illustrated by analogy to chess-
playing computers: “The genes too control the behaviour of their survival machines, not 
directly with their fingers on puppet strings, but indirectly like the computer programmer.”220 
By further extension , the sum of the computer analogy and the disinterested survival machine 
is the robot:  
Four thousand million years on, what was to be the fate of the ancient replicators? 
They did not die out for they are past masters of the survival arts. But do not look for 
them floating loose in the sea; they gave up their cavalier freedom long ago. Now they 
swarm in huge colonies, safe inside gigantic lumbering robots, sealed off from the 
outside world, communicating with us by tortuous indirect routes, manipulating it by 
remote controls.
221
   
 
With the image of the robot, the survival machine is no longer synonymous with a 
disinterested nervous system; it becomes representative of artificial intelligence. In the notes 
to the second edition of The Selfish Gene, the fusion of man and machine is two-way:  
We are in the golden age of electronics, and robots are no longer rigidly inflexible 
morons, but are capable of learning, intelligence, and creativity. Ironically, even as 
long ago as 1920 when Karel Capek coined the word, ‘robots’ were mechanical beings 
that ended up with human feelings like falling in love. People who think that robots 
are by definition more ‘deterministic’ than human beings are muddled.222 
 
While it is noteworthy that it is a work of fiction that provides the rationale for the merging of 
man and computer, it is more relevant at this point to note that the mechanic control that the 
brain has upon the nervous system here becomes identical with consciousness. This also 
concerns the reader directly: “What on earth do you think you are, if not a robot, albeit a very 
complicated one?”223  
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  While the notion of human as intelligent machine has been fruitfully developed as a 
philosophical idea elsewhere,
224
 the analogous relationship is here less philosophical than 
material. In spite of the modification: “There is no reason why the influence of genes cannot 
easily be reversed by other influences,”225 the conceptualization of man as robot grounds the 
genetic as if calculation in consciousness, making the agenda of the gene the agenda of the 
survival machine, as for instance in this hypothetical example:  
If we were to program a computer to simulate a model survival machine making 
decisions about whether to behave altruistically, we should probably proceed roughly 
as follows. We should make a list of all the alternative things the animal might do. 
Then for each of these alternative behaviour patterns we program a weighted sum 
calculation. All the various benefits will have a plus sign; all the risks will have a 
minus sign; both benefits and risks will be weighted by being multiplied by the 
appropriate index of relatedness before being added up.
226
    
 
The passage introduces the logic of cost-benefit calculation which is the essence of ESS-
theory and subsequently the fundament of kin-selection upon which the selfish gene theory 
rests: the idea that altruism towards individuals will ideally be proportional to closeness in 
kin-relation, i.e. in the amount of shared genes. In turn, the programming process is translated 
to a simplified and hypothetical subjective soliloquy: “I am an animal who has found a clump 
of eight mushrooms. After taking account of their nutritional value ... I estimate that they are 
worth +6 units each ...”227 But in the passage before all this, the as-if calculations are 
illustrated in terms of human consciousness: 
When a man throws a ball high up in the air and catches it again, he behaves as if he 
had solved a set of differential equations in predicting the trajectory of the ball ... At 
some subconscious level, something functionally equal to the mathematical 
calculations is going on. Similarly, when a man takes a difficult decision, after 
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weighing up all the pros and cons, and all the consequences of the decision that he can 
imagine, he is doing the functional equivalent of a large ‘weighted sum’ calculation, 
such as a computer might perform.
228
 
 
The juxtaposition of disinterested and (sub- or) unconscious muscular contractions with 
conscious reflection provides the intuitive rationale for unconscious cost-benefit calculation 
by connecting the recognizable ‘weighing up of pros and cons’ to computer programming. In 
the process, however, it renders man’s consciousness inherently rational. A chess playing 
computer may act irrationally only by default – the concept of the disinterested survival 
machine does not only make possible writing outside of consciousness; when it provides an 
all-encompassing underlying principle of all life, it also excludes irrationality other than by 
default, disregarding the almost limitless capacity of irrationality that a conscious individual 
inhabits. The language of convenience, appealing to identification, the tale of the immortal 
gene juxtaposed to the mortal body, and the fundamental rationality which is played out, have 
a joint uncanny effect, reinforced by the fundamental genetic rationality manifesting itself in 
behaviour.  
 At the opening of this sub-chapter, we saw that, in the later editions of Dawkins’s 
book, a chapter was added that addressed an ‘uneasy tension disturbing the heart of the selfish 
gene theory: the tension between gene and individual body as fundamental agent of life’.229 
The problem is connected to the ‘rogue sentences’ that we saw in 1.3 in this thesis, wordings 
that the reader should mentally delete because they confuse individual selfishness with gene 
selfishness. The answer to the problem apparently lies in distinguishing the survival machine 
from the gene:   
In earlier chapters
230
 I made the assumption that there was no problem, because 
individual reproduction was equivalent to gene survival. I assumed there that you can 
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say either ‘The organism works to propagate its genes’ or ‘The genes work to force a 
succession of organisms to propagate them.’ They seemed like two equivalent ways of 
saying the same thing, and which form of words you chose seemed a matter of taste.   
One way of sorting this whole matter is to use the terms ‘replicator’ and 
‘vehicle’. The fundamental units of natural selection, the basic things that survive or 
fail to survive, that form lineages of identical copies with occasional random 
mutations, are called replicators. DNA molecules are replicators. ... The vehicles that 
we know best are individual bodies like our own. A body, then, is not a replicator; it is 
a vehicle. I must emphasize this, since the point has been misunderstood. Vehicles 
don’t propagate themselves; they work to propagate their replicators. Replicators don’t 
behave, don’t perceive the world, don’t catch pray or run away from predators; they 
make vehicles that do all those things.
231
 
 
This clarification deals with the misconception that the gene was attributed real intention, and 
that selfish behaviour was identical to gene selfishness. While the separation between gene 
and vehicle was obviously called for, the last sentence: ‘they make vehicles do all those 
things’ carries with it the displacement of agency, and the vague notion that free will is an 
illusion. In the preceding chapter of The Selfish Gene, the notion of ruthless selfishness is 
toned down with reference to research made by the political scientist R. Axelrod, who 
launched a competition between experts in game theory to submit rivalling strategies in order 
to find which strategies would be evolutionarily stable in the specific environment.
232
 The 
strategies were categorized as ‘nice’, ‘nasty’, ‘remorseful’, ‘unforgiving’, ‘forgiving’,233 and 
the Winning strategies turned out to be those who exhibited a certain degree of niceness and 
forgivingness. Hence, not only selfish behaviour benefits the selfish gene in terms of survival: 
“Without departing from the fundamental laws of the selfish gene, we can see how 
cooperation and mutual assistance can flourish even in a basically selfish world.”234The moral 
problem posed by Mary Midgley as discussed in 1.3 above are seemingly solved. The 
question is; where does that leave The Selfish Gene? The final note of the original edition 
reads: “We are built as gene machines and cultured as meme machines, but we have the 
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power to turn against our creators. We, alone on earth, can rebel against the tyranny of selfish 
replicators.”235  
 Selfish genes are still the inner daemons of man, the true nature of nature. Their 
agency is indirect but powerful:  “Genes have something to gain from selfishly promoting the 
welfare of their own individual bodies.”236 Given that the gene is acknowledged to cooperate 
with kin, and in cases where it may promote the welfare of the survival machine, ‘self 
interest’ is perhaps a better word, and the two terms are occasionally used interchangeably in 
the book.
237
 Hayles recognizes an ideological backdrop:  
Even though one’s own agency is co-opted, agency itself is preserved. The key to the 
narrative is autonomy. To qualify as a “real” actor in the drama, an agent has to be 
able to preserve its own identity and defend itself against encroaching foreign 
elements. The winners are those actors who can subvert and co-opt another’s agency 
while keep (sic) their own intact. In this sense Dawkins’s gene is the ultimate 
individual, the triumphant product of that brand of Anglo-American ideology that 
ignores the complexities of social and economic contexts and declares success or 
failure to be solely the result of individual initiative.
238
   
 
It is possible to discern the individualistic ideology in passages like this:  
Many copies of good genes are dragged under because they happen to share a body 
with bad genes, and many perish through other forms of ill luck, say when their body 
is struck by lightning. But by definition luck, good or bad, strikes at random, and a 
gene that is consistently on the losing side is not unlucky; it is a bad gene. 
One of the qualities of a good oarsman is teamwork, the ability to fit in and 
cooperate with the rest of the crew.
239
 
 
Hayles’ is a political reading, but it is not irrelevant. In the last of the additional chapters, 
while the selfishness of genes is modified, its rationale is elevated to the true meaning of life:  
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In some chapters of this book we have indeed thought of the individual 
organism as an agent, striving to maximize its success in passing on all its genes. We 
imagined individual animals making complicated economic ‘as if’ calculations about 
the genetic benefits of various courses of action. Yet in other chapters the fundamental 
rationale was presented from the point of view of genes. Without the gene’s eye view 
of life there is no particular reason why an organism should ‘care’ about its 
reproductive success and of its relatives, rather than, for instance, its longevity.
240
 
 
While there are some indications of what the fundamental rationale is not, it is not clear what 
it actually is, or to which degree it is based in anticipation or conclusion. If we turn to the 
preface to the 30
th
 Anniversary edition, published in 2006 we are all the wiser:  
Let me repeat and expand the rationale for the word ‘selfish’ in the title. The 
critical question is which level in the hierarchy of life will turn out to be the inevitably 
‘selfish’ level, at which natural selection acts? The Selfish Species? The Selfish 
Group? The Selfish Organism? The Selfish Ecosystem? Most of these could be 
argued, and most of them have been critically assumed by one or another author, but 
all of them are wrong. Given that the Darwinian message is going to be pithily 
encapsulated The Selfish Something, that something turns out to be the gene, for 
cogent reasons that the book argues.
241
  
 
Selfishness is given – hence it is the precondition of the theory. The governing principle of 
selfishness suggests that this might be a case of bad poetic science, where the metaphor itself 
becomes the governing principle of the theory. If this foundation carries with it the 
fundamental rationale of all life, it is appropriate to enquire on which assumptions it rests, and 
which implications it carries with it. This issue will be the subject of the next chapter of my 
thesis. Included in my discussion will be the functions of the narrator as methodological 
control, the function of analogy in establishing the genetic rationale, and the notion of 
‘reading nature’. 
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Chapter 3: Reading Nature 
 
 
What was the primitive tissue? 
In that way Lydgate put the question – not 
quite in the way required by the awaiting 
answer; but such missing of the right word 
befalls many seekers.
242
  
 
 
Scientific theories and language do not cause social  
or natural reality but rather become co-constructions  
in social structure and interpretations of the natural  
world that then create a loop of legitimation for 
 ideas or institutions that are created and reinforced.
243
 
 
 
3.1 The Multiple Voices of The Selfish Gene  
 
 
In the second edition of The Selfish Gene, Dawkins deals with the moral and ideological 
criticism that has been part of the book’s reception history:  
I must add that the occasional political asides in this chapter make uncomfortable 
rereading for me in 1989. ‘How many times must this [the need to restrain selfish 
greed to prevent the destruction of the whole group] have been said in recent years to 
the working people in Britain?’ (p. 8) makes me sound like a Tory! In 1975, when this 
was written, a socialist government which I had helped to vote in was battling 
desperately against 23 per cent inflation, and was obviously concerned about high 
wage claims. My remark could have been taken from the speech of any Labour 
minister of the time. Now that Britain has a government to the new right, which has 
elevated meanness and selfishness to the status of ideology, my words seem to have 
acquired a kind of nastiness by association, which I regret. It is not that I take back 
what I said. Selfish short-sightedness has the undesirable consequences that I 
mentioned. But nowadays, if one were seeking examples of short sightedness in 
Britain, one would not look first at the working class. Actually, it is probably best not 
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to burden a scientific work with political asides at all, since it is remarkable how 
quickly these date.
244
  
 
With this note, the political statement of the original edition is resituated in its original 
context, demonstrating how social changes have destabilized the point of reference. 
Interestingly, Dawkins’s musing on the appropriateness of ‘political asides’ in a scientific text 
is more concerned with their durability than with their ideological implications. As mentioned 
in 1.1 in this thesis, the author function is thus presented as the guarantee of the political 
implications of the book, and hence contributes to discouraging ideological and moral 
criticism such as that of Goatly, who sees the selfish gene theory as a scientific expression of 
Reaganism-Thatcherism,
245
 Midgley, who reads gene selfishness as a moral doctrine
246
 and 
Hayles, who recognizes an Anglo-American ideological backdrop in the agency of selfish 
genes.
247
 The authorial presence thus both situates the author and his intentions in the text, 
and provides the conditions for a ‘correct’ reading. The personal preferences of the author are 
further established in the additional Chapter Twelve in the second edition of The Selfish Gene:     
A question that sociologists and psychologists sometimes ask is why blood 
donors (in countries, such as Britain, where they are not paid) give blood. I find it hard 
to believe that the answer lies in reciprocity or disguised selfishness in any simple 
sense. It is not as though regular blood donors receive preferential treatment when they 
come to need a transfusion. They are not even issued with little gold stars to wear. 
Maybe I’m naïve, but I find myself tempted to see it as a genuine case of pure, 
disinterested altruism.
248
 
 
The strategy of depicting the author function as naïve has the function of designation, in 
Foucault’s sense, rather than description; it redefines the depiction of a cynical and liberalist 
author-function which some critics, performing ideological readings, have identified. With 
this reference to the author-figure, criticism of the ideological implications of the book 
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becomes a personal matter. Personal statements like I believe ... or I feel ... cannot be refuted; 
they are intrinsically true. The personal tone does not only occur as an answer to criticism; it 
is invoked on some occasions in the original edition as well, in what could be seen as an 
anticipation of ideological criticism:     
My own feeling is that a human society based simply on the gene’s law of 
universal ruthless selfishness would be a very nasty society in which to live. But 
unfortunately, however much we deplore something, it does not stop it being true. This 
book is mainly intended to be interesting, but if you would extract a moral from it, 
read it as a warning. Be warned that if you wish, as I do, to build a society in which 
individuals cooperate generously and unselfishly towards a common good, you can 
expect little help from biological nature.
249
    
 
In this passage the narrator’s (or author’s?) ‘own feeling’ and conviction is contrasted to the 
objective and disinterested scientific truth of the selfish gene theory. Subsequently, it gives 
the vague indication that potential critics will be given to wishful thinking. Hence, the 
author’s scientific integrity is increased; he is acknowledging an unpleasant scientific truth. 
Whereas the conventional passive voice emphasises an objective and disinterested 
representation, the active mode is here used to the same end.  
 Beer distinguishes the function of the active voice in the Origin: “The voiced presence 
of the observer in the language is a necessary methodological control, supplementing the 
work’s imaginary history.”250 The reflexive narrator of The Selfish Gene too functions as a 
methodological control, on the one hand a supplement to the imaginative venture of 
personification as we have seen in the previous chapter of this thesis, and on the other as a 
guide to reading. The explicit endeavour to restrict reading and guide interpretation is 
particularly clear in the opening of the book.  The first chapter is dedicated almost in its 
entirety to this control, and can be read as a manual for interpretation. Considering that the 
book addresses a broad readership, such a guide may be useful both for clearing up potential 
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misunderstanding and for assisting the reader in the reading-process. However, it is prudent to 
investigate how the book correspond to these instructions, and whether they can be said to 
function productively or constraining. The first restriction is concerned with a potential moral 
reading: “I am not advocating a morality based on evolution. I am saying how things have 
evolved. I am not saying how we humans morally ought to behave.”251 We have already seen 
this imperative modification in several forms and on a number of occasions. While the 
message that human selfishness is not depicted as desirable is to some extent appropriate, the 
claim that the book is merely a narrative of natural process suggests that a reading focusing on 
the normative implications of the text is per se irrelevant. Following this instruction would 
entail ignoring the meaning potential of language, and to perform a purely scientific reading. 
However, the legitimacy of this requirement is questionable, considering that the language of 
the book does not aspire to accomplish a scientifically conform expression, but rather, as we 
have seen, relies on a creative language and abstraction.  
Further restrictions on reading are the statements that the book is not “an advocacy of 
one position or another in the nature/nurture controversy” 252  and that it is not “a descriptive 
account of the detailed behaviour of man or any other particular animal species. I shall use 
factual details only as illustrative examples.”253 Implicit in the last assertion is an instruction 
to read factual details exclusively as affirmative for whichever claim they are meant to 
illustrate or support. The implied, or ideal, reader thus becomes a constitutive element of the 
text. This notion is reinforced by the reflexive narrator after a series of examples on selfish 
and seemingly altruistic behaviour among animals: “I am not trying to make a point by telling 
stories. Chosen examples are never serious evidence for any worthwhile generalization. These 
stories are simply intended as illustrations of what I mean by altruistic and selfish behaviour 
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at the level of individuals.”254 By renouncing the scientific value of ‘stories’ and ‘chosen 
examples’ the narrator is in the position to disclaim their status as scientific evidence, while 
still relying on the persuasive quality of example and, by extension, analogy. In effect, the 
plea is to unread the implications and presumptions on which analogy and examples rest, and 
simply absorb their meaning in a way that coheres with the inner logic and explicit intention 
of the text.    
 The reflexive narrator thus draws up the conditions for reading which the authorial 
presence confirms. On other occasions, the reflexive narrator functions more as a meta-
narrator, commenting and to some extent reading the turns of the book, speaking from a place 
outside of the text:  
If building a baby is such an intricate cooperative venture, and if every gene needs 
several thousands of fellow genes to complete its task, how can we reconcile this with 
my picture of indivisible genes, springing like immortal chamois from body to body 
down the ages: the free, untrammelled, and self-seeking agents of life? Was all that 
nonsense? Not at all. I may have got a bit carried away with the purple passages, but I 
was not talking nonsense, and there is no real paradox. We can explain this by means 
of another analogy.
255
   
  
The meta-narrator looks back on the text as if in retrospect, commenting on the ‘purple 
passages’ as if the argument were in real time and not a carefully structured narrative. The 
notion that the narrator has ‘got a bit carried away’ furthermore emphasizes the notion of the 
“fever of excitement”256 in which the book was written, which calls for indulgence on the part 
of the reader, as discussed in 1.3 in this thesis. The meta-narrator appeals to the sympathetic 
reader, adding credibility to the text by engaging the reader in a relationship of trust:  
[I]f sexual, as opposed to non-sexual, reproduction benefits a gene for sexual 
reproduction, that is a sufficient explanation for the existence of sexual reproduction. 
Seen from the selfish gene’s point of view, sex is not so bizarre after all.   
This comes perilously close to being a circular argument, since the existence of 
sexuality is a precondition for the whole chain of reasoning that leads to the gene 
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being regarded as the unit of selection. I believe there are ways of escaping from the 
circularity, but this book is not the place to pursue the question. Sex exists. That much 
is true.
257
 
 
The ideal reader is assured that there is indeed no reason to be sceptical of the circularity of 
argument, and the guarantee of trustworthiness is in itself based in the self-reflexive 
admittance of the logical problem. By stating the obvious: ‘Sex exists’ after assuring the 
reader that there is no real problem, the ‘must be’ conclusion is brought into play, and will be 
affirmed as the argument develops. While on the one hand appealing to the sympathetic 
reader, the meta-narrator also indicates a notion of underlying credibility and control. For 
instance in the process of accounting for possible evolutionarily stable strategies in animal 
combat and rivalry: “Once again, by using words, we have talked ourselves into picturing an 
oscillation in a population. Once again, mathematical analysis shows that this is not 
correct.”258 Oscillation – the alternation of two potentially dominant strategies depending on 
which one is more beneficial at a given moment – suggests an error, since the whole idea is to 
predict one dominant strategy which may account for a specific kind of, in this case, 
aggressive behaviour. The reflexive interruption by the meta-narrator demonstrates awareness 
of the danger of lapsing into bad poetic science where language misleads the scientist into 
what is only seemingly a logical conclusion.
259
  
 An additional voice of the meta-narrator is present in the notes added to the second 
edition of The Selfish Gene. Here the eye is in fact retrospect and situated outside of the text, 
as the Dawkins of 1989 comments on the tone in the original version of 1976, specifically in 
the 9
th
 chapter “Battle of the Sexes” dealing with exploitation between mates. The opening of 
the chapter reads: “If there is a conflict of interest between parents and children, who share 50 
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per cent of each other’s genes, how much more severe must be the conflict between mates, 
who are not related to each other?”260 The meta-narrator comments:  
This is one of the places in the book where my tone swung too far towards the cynical, 
selfish view of life. At the time it seemed necessary, since the dominant view of 
animal courtship had swung too far in the other direction. ... In this historical context 
the apparent cynicism of my opening sentence is understandable, but today I would 
adopt a softer tone.
261
 
 
Paradoxically, the acknowledgment of the excessive cynicism of expression in the original 
publication is both a trust-inducing confession and a contextualizing justification of the 
cynical tone on the one hand, and evokes suspicion on the other: it becomes clear that the 
writer is administering facts and rhetoric in order to persuade. This notion is confirmed by the 
note to this statement: “I have a hunch that we may come to look back on the invention of the 
ESS concept as one of the most important advances in evolutionary theory since Darwin.”262 
Since ESS is the central tenet of the book, this personal ‘hunch’ gives power to the 
argumentation; the ‘discovery’ of ESS has revealed the true workings of evolution. However, 
in the note, the claim is toned down: “This sentence is a bit over the top. I was probably 
overreacting to the then prevalent neglect of the ESS idea in the contemporary biological 
literature, especially in America … The term is neglected no longer, and I can now take a 
more judicious and less evangelical view.”263 In this modification, the importance of gaining 
power of definition becomes clear. While one might argue that exaggeration and verbal 
slanting is more common in popular writing than in professional science writing, the genre of 
‘public science’ – rooted in the notion of the imaginary expert reader – warrants scientific 
credibility. The notion of an ‘evangelical view’ disturbs this credibility.   
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 Whereas the meta-narrator in a sense operates outside of the text, the reflexive narrator 
in the text opens for a dialectical, Socratic structure, including the reader in the argument:  
On the face of it, this [animal acceptance of flock hierarchy] seems an awkward 
example for the selfish gene theory to explain. Why don’t the outcasts try, try, and try 
again to oust a territory holder, until they drop from exhaustion? But wait, perhaps 
they do have something to lose.
264
  
 
Again, I will turn to Beer’s reading of the Origin in order to illuminate the structural choice: 
The language of the Origin emphasises the element of address. Conversation rather 
than abstraction is the predominant mode, and the emphasis is upon things 
individually seen, heard, smelt, touched, tasted. The voiced presence of the observer 
in the language is a necessary methodological control, supplementing the work’s 
imaginative history.
265
    
 
Similarly, the reflexive narrator of The Selfish Gene conversationally addresses the reader, 
with the addition that what is seen, heard, smelt, touched, tasted and felt is emphasised. The 
comparison is, of course, not exhaustive: as demonstrated in the previous chapter of this 
thesis, Dawkins’s text is indeed based in abstraction. The conversational mode serves to 
supplement the abstract meaning: “Analogies with computers and with human decision taking 
are all very well. But now we must come down to earth and remember that evolution in fact 
occurs step-by-step, through the differential survival of the genes in the gene-pool.”266 The 
narrator takes the argument ‘down to earth,’ and is as such a controlling element, in a sense 
checking the overly enthusiastic writer. The dialectical, conversational structure also gives an 
impression of openness, as in this example, when the narrator points to the chosen definition 
of the gene: “What I have now done is to define the gene in such a way that I cannot really 
help being right!”267 The exclamation mark indicates something resembling surprise, and the 
seeming circularity of argument is modified in the next paragraph: “What I have done is to 
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define a gene as a unit which, to a high degree approaches the ideal of indivisible 
particulateness.”268 While on the one hand anticipating criticism, this rhetorical turn functions 
to include the reader in the development of the argument and indicates that the text does not 
underestimate the reader. 
The textual strategy of addressing the reader opens for an including ‘we’ functioning 
on multiple levels. The reader is introduced to a universal ‘we’ at an early stage: “The 
argument of this book is that we, and all other animals, are machines created by our genes.”269 
The ‘we’ situates both the narrator and the reader in the evolutionary narrative, and thus 
establishes the narrator and the reader on common ground, in turn opening for a personal 
approach: “One of your genetic units may also be present in your second cousin. It may be 
present in me, and in the Prime Minister and in your dog, for we all share ancestors if we go 
back far enough.”270 On a humorous note, the narrator may take a somewhat frivolous 
approach and the including ‘we’ places the reader in an intimate relation with the narrator. 
This intimacy in turn gives the narrator licence to operate in a personal sphere, as in this 
example where kin-selection is introduced: “It is rather tedious going through the calculations 
from first principles every time, so here is a rough and ready rule for working out the 
relatedness between any two individuals A and B. You may find it useful in working out your 
will, or in interpreting apparent resemblances in your own family.”271 The participation of the 
reader in the construction of the argument, and the establishing of the including ‘we’ provides 
the possibility of making an ideal reading of the text a matter of course, as in this passage 
towards the end of the original edition:  
Mutual grooming is in fact very common in both birds and animals.  
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This makes immediate intuitive sense. Anybody with conscious foresight can 
see that it is sensible to enter into mutual back-scratching arrangements. But we have 
learned to beware of what seems intuitively sensible.
272
 
 
‘We have learned’ gives the impression that reading has been a communal endeavour, that the 
ideal reader has gone through the same journey of discovery and acknowledgement as the 
narrator, or even the author in the origination of the selfish gene theory. Thus, the imaginary, 
abstract and intuitive understanding of the gene’s rationale and of ESS has become a matter of 
rational inference, while intuitive understandings clashing with the core of the selfish gene 
theory are seen as a threat to the disinterested scientific rationality. By absorbing the reader in 
the argumentative development, the narrator has ascertained the power of definition, and the 
selfish gene theory is presented as the only realistic perspective on biological development.  
 
 
3.2  The Ideal Reader and the Power of Definition 
 
 
The including ‘we’ furthermore opens for an oppositional ‘them’ or marginal ‘other’, which 
in turn may make the alliance between the reader and the narrator stronger, and may also 
forestall criticism. I have discussed the latter strategy elsewhere this thesis, for instance in 1.3 
where I commented on how critics were suspected of reading the book ‘by title only’ or of 
simply not understanding its scientific message. The narrator’s recommendation of the book 
Social Evolution by Robert L. Trivers has a similar effect: ”I recommend it, not only for its 
contents but for its style: clear-thinking, academically correct but with just enough 
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anthropomorphic irresponsibility to tease the pompous ...”273 The rhetorical twist is almost 
banal, yet efficient: if the reader is sceptical toward the anthropomorphisms of The Selfish 
Gene, she represents the other, the unwilling and petty contrast to the ideal reader. Hence, 
criticism of the anthropocentric language is discouraged, and the implicit instruction is again 
to unread anthropomorphism.  
Another effective opposition is religion, which is referred to in apparently incidental 
remarks, in ironical biblical references may which take the form of analogy, for instance in an 
example of genetic copying-errors resulting in mutation, illustrated by an analogy to the hand-
written copying of the Bible, leading to the erroneous biblical representation of the ‘virgin 
mother’.274 The juxtaposition of religious references in the book not only serves to discredit 
religion, a project that Dawkins is famously known for pursuing,
275
 it may also give the 
selfish gene theory added realism and rationality by comparison. By polarization, the ideal 
reader is firmly guided into taking the ‘clear-thinking’ position, and to confirm the ideas of 
the book on rational grounds, as for instance in this note to the second edition:  
People who think that robots are by definition more ‘deterministic’ than human beings 
are muddled (unless they are religious, in which case they might consistently hold that 
humans have some divine gift of free will denied to mere mechanics). If, like most of 
the critics of my ‘lumbering robot’ passage, you are not religious, then face up to the 
following question. What on earth do you think you are if not a robot?
276
   
 
The rhetorical trap and the personal challenge are obvious; only ‘muddled’ people or the 
fundamentally irrational religious would question the appropriateness of human as artificial 
intelligence. In consequence, the normative aspect of the metaphor, as for instance the 
conception of irrationality by default as discussed in 3.4 in this thesis, goes unmentioned.  
Anthropologists and social scientists fulfil a similar function of irrational otherness:  
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Many social anthropologists are preoccupied with ‘kinship’ in the societies which they 
study. … Human customs and tribal rituals commonly give great emphasis to kinship; 
ancestor worship is wide-spread, family obligations and loyalties dominate much of 
life. Blood-feuds and inter-clan warfare are easily interpretable in terms of Hamilton’s 
genetic theory. Incest taboos testify to the great kinship-consciousness of man, 
although the genetical advantage of an incest taboo is nothing to do with altruism; it is 
presumably concerned with the injurious effects of recessive genes which appear with 
inbreeding. (For some reason many anthropologists do not like this explanation.)
277
 
 
The social phenomenon of legislation against incest ‘testifies’ to biological facts, and the 
theory is in effect merging ‘nature and nurture’. The slight puzzlement of the narrator towards 
the scepticism of anthropologist is elaborated in an end note:   
Anthropologists who object to Darwinian explanations of incest-avoidance 
perhaps do not realize what a strong Darwinian case they are opposing. Their 
arguments are sometimes so weak as to suggest desperate special pleading. They 
commonly say, for instance: ‘If Darwinian selection had really built into us an 
instinctive revulsion against incest, we wouldn’t need to forbid it. The taboo only 
grows up because people have incestuous lusts. So the rule against incest cannot have 
a “biological” function, it must be purely “social”.’ This objection is rather like the 
following: ‘Cars don’t need locks on the ignition switch because they have locks on 
the doors. Therefore ignition locks cannot be anti-theft devices; they must have some 
purely ritual significance!’278 
 
While the conflict appears to me to revolve around the question of whether incestuous lust 
should not, according to the selfish gene theory, have been disfavoured by natural selection 
because it reduces the chances of gene survival, the rather ridiculous parallel of car-locks 
serves to discredit the criticism posed by anthropologists. Again, the rationality of the theory 
is enforced by contrast to an irrational other, and the ideal reader places herself in the camp of 
the clear-thinking.   
 The status of the selfish gene theory as clear thinking is also contrasted to other 
biological theories, most markedly that of group selection. Group selection – the idea that 
natural selection occurs on group-level for the good of the species, was more dominant when 
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The Selfish Gene was first published than it is today, and in many respects the book can be 
said to be an advocacy against this perception:  
Although the group-selection theory now commands little support within the 
ranks of those professional biologists who understand evolution, it does have great 
intuitive appeal...  
 Perhaps one reason for the great appeal of the group-selection theory is that it 
is thoroughly in tune with the moral and political ideas that most of us share.
279
   
 
The fact that the selfish gene theory does not concur with a moral intuition here becomes a 
supporting element for its status as disinterested and rational in contrast to the wishful 
thinking of group-selectionists. The gene-centred view of natural selection is also indirectly 
contrasted to ‘Neo-Lamarckian’ theory280, which may also include epigenetics, meaning, as 
the word suggests, influence outside of or other than, the gene
281: “Genes do indirectly control 
the manufacture of bodies, and the influence is strictly one way: acquired characteristics are 
not inherited”282. This quote is taken from the original edition of The Selfish Gene, which was 
written in a period when  
the ‘inheritance of acquired characteristics’ was seen as the ultimate Darwinian 
heresy. Those who have sought to support or research this area in any way have often 
been depicted as acting on the maverick fringes of the scientific community. This is 
the atmosphere in which Dawkins began his scientific career, and subsequently wrote 
The Selfish Gene.
283
  
 
Elsdon-Baker adds that “if any environmentally driven inheritance of acquired characteristics 
were to occur in nature – as now seems increasingly likely, given new findings in some areas 
of research – it would completely undermine Dawkins’ ‘selfish gene’ hypothesis.”284 In the 
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notes to the second edition the notion of inheritance of acquired characteristics is mentioned 
only briefly:  
Superficially, successive generations of stick-insect bodies appear to constitute 
a lineage of replicas. But if you experimentally change one member of the lineage (for 
instance by removing a leg), the change is not passed on down the lineage. This ... is 
the fundamental reason for saying that the individual organism is not the ‘unit of 
selection’ – not a true replicator. It is one of the most important reasons for the 
universally admitted fact that the ‘Lamarckian’ theory of inheritance is false.285    
 
The claim that the Lamarckian theory is ‘universally admitted’ to be false, was added in 1989, 
and the preface to the 30
th
 Anniversary Edition of 2006 does not mention the issue. While the 
contrasting oppositions of religion and social sciences could be said to be directed towards the 
ideal reader and making her a conspiring agent, the marginalization of Lamarckian theory, 
and therefore also of the notion of inheritance of acquired characteristics, has a more general 
effect. In the words of Elsdon-Baker: 
[D]oes it really mean anything any more to call someone a Darwinian, an anti-
Darwinian or a Lamarckian? Surely, the only purpose these labels can serve is to 
define an antithesis to one’s own perspective. Over the past 60 years they have really 
acted, in the public sphere at least, as a rather crude shorthand for who is ‘in’ and who 
is ‘out’ in the scientific community ... And to be labelled anti-Darwinian has now, 
more than ever taken on a whole new meaning – it now carries with it the stigma of 
pseudo-science or, at worst, of fuelling anti-scientific sentiment.
286
  
 
Notably, Elsdon-Baker emphasizes the power of labels in the ‘public sphere’. This is an 
important aspect of the genre of ‘public science’: the power of definition and of establishing a 
public common sense. In the ocean of information that modern man is exposed to, rough 
categories may be all the more powerful because they help to navigate and discriminate 
between orthodox science and ‘pseudo-science’. In this respect, the selfish gene theory, 
defined as Neo-Darwinism, and in turn as The Orthodox Evolutionary Theory, has great 
power to colour public opinion. I touched upon this issue in 1.1 in this thesis, and quoted 
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Elsdon-Baker on the claim that “Neo-Darwinists conflate their own ideas with Darwinism.”287 
The entry on Neo-Darwinism in the glossary in an appendix to Dawkins’ second book, The 
Extended Phenotype, first published in 1982
288
 illustrates this conflation:  
neo-Darwinism: A term coined (actually re-coined, for the word was used in the 
1880s for a very different group of evolutionists) in the middle part of this 
century. Its purpose was to emphasize (and in my opinion exaggerate) the 
distinctness of the modern synthesis of Darwinism and Mendelian genetics, 
achieved in the 1920s and 1930s, from Darwin’s own view of evolution. I think 
the need for the ‘neo’ is fading, and Darwin’s own approach to ‘the economy 
of nature’ now looks very modern.289  
 
With this entry, the message is conveyed that the Neo-Darwinist approach which the selfish 
gene theory represents is not one of several theories, but the one and only realistic alternative, 
rendering other suggestions marginal and other. With this observation, I draw this more 
general discussion to a close, and enter into a more specific discussion of ‘the economy of 
nature’ and the role of analogy in The Selfish Gene.  
 
 
3.3 The Analogical Argument 
 
Evelyn Fox Keller in her book Making Sense of Life
290
 observes the power of D’Arcy 
Thompson’s291 visual analogies:”Indeed, so effective are some of his examples that the 
readers may find themselves inexorably drawn to a more certain conviction – not merely of 
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possibility but of actuality.”292 This section will be concerned with the power of not visual, 
but social analogy. The analogical argument of The Selfish Gene is particularly intriguing due 
to the explicit claim by the narrator that “I am not trying to make a point by telling stories. 
Chosen examples are never serious evidence for any worthwhile generalization.”293 I argued 
in 3.1 that this claim in effect encourages the reader to unread analogies, other than in terms 
of their potential of illumination and in turn confirmation of the selfish gene theory. A 
requirement of good poetic science, as we have seen in 1.3, is that it “should note helpful 
analogies and metaphors that stimulate the imagination, conjure in the mind images and 
allusions that go beyond the needs of straightforward understanding.”294 Unreading analogy 
takes part in the ‘conjuring in the mind of images and allusions’, contributing to the 
achievement of a seamless effect of imaginative stimulation. Thus, allusion by analogy may 
open for the mental transition from ‘possibility to actuality’, as Keller puts it. In effect, then, 
analogy may establish a universal foundation upon which generalization may be ensured 
without appealing to ‘chosen example as evidence for generalization’, like in this example:   
Animals have to be given by their genes a simple rule for action, a rule that does not 
involve all-wise cognition of the ultimate purpose of the action, but a rule that works 
nevertheless, at least in average conditions. We humans are familiar with rules, and so 
powerful are they that if we are small minded we obey a rule itself, even when we can 
see perfectly well that it is not doing us, or anybody else, any good. For instance, some 
orthodox Jews and Muslims would starve rather than break their rules against eating 
pork. What simple practical rules could animals obey which, under normal conditions, 
would have the indirect effect of benefiting their close relations?
295
 
 
In this passage, the urge to obey rules is depicted as universal – a notion that in turn confirms 
the image of genetic information in the form of instructions. The effect of recognition gains 
force by rapid transition; ‘Animals have to be given instructions...’ is directly preceded by 
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human reference and recognition: ‘We humans are familiar with rules...’ before turning back 
to unconscious animals on the grounds of the universality of rules, notably in the subjunctive: 
‘What simple practical rules could animals obey...?’ Thus, the rationale for gene instruction is 
forcefully established, but not claimed as empirical truth.  
The language of convenience in itself opens for conjuration by virtue of recognition, 
as discussed in 3.1 in this thesis. The anthropomorphic language gains a particularly 
prominent social relevance in Chapter 8 “The Battle of The Sexes.”296 In the discussion of the 
ESS of mates, Dawkins suggests a model based on the anthropomorphic categories ‘coy’ or 
‘fast’ females and ‘faithful’ or ‘philanderer’ males:   
The behavioural rules of the four types are as follows. Coy females will not copulate 
with a male until he has gone through a long and expansive courtship lasting several 
weeks. Fast females will copulate immediately with anybody. Faithful males are 
prepared to go on courting for a long time, and after copulation they stay with the 
female and help her to rear the young. Philanderer males lose patience quickly if a 
female will not copulate with them straight away: they go off and look for another 
female; after copulation too they do not stay and act as good fathers, but go off in 
search for fresh females. ... [T]hese are not the only possible strategies, but it is 
illuminating to study their fates nevertheless.
297
   
 
At the end of the chapter, the reflexive narrator comments on the human reference:  
I have not explicitly talked about man, but inevitably, when we think about 
evolutionary arguments such as those in this chapter, we cannot help reflecting about 
our own species and our experience. Notions of females withholding copulation until a 
male shows some evidence of long-term fidelity may strike a familiar chord. This 
might suggest that human females play the domestic-bliss strategy rather than the he-
man strategy. Many human societies are indeed monogamous. In our own society, 
parental investment is large and not obviously unbalanced. Mothers certainly do more 
direct work for children than fathers do, but fathers often work hard in a more indirect 
sense to provide the material resources that are poured into children. On the other 
hand, some human societies are promiscuous. What this astonishing variety suggests is 
that man’s way of life is largely determined by culture rather than by genes. However, 
it is still possible that human males in general have a tendency towards promiscuity, 
and females a tendency towards monogamy, as we would predict on evolutionary 
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grounds. Which of these two tendencies wins in a particular society depends on details 
of cultural circumstance, just as in different animal species it depends on ecological 
details.
298
 
 
In this passage lies both modification and assertion; on the one hand, human society is  
written out of genetic determination by the emphasis on cultural influence. On the other, 
human society is divided into the categories of either ‘promiscuous’ or ‘monogamous’, and 
the model of human society on which the ESS of animals was established is reinserted in the 
human sphere, resulting in a ‘loop of legitimation’.  
This term was coined by the social theorist Diane Rodgers in her book Debugging the 
Link Between Social Theory and Social Insects
299
 published in 2008:   
Scientific theories and language do not cause social or natural reality but rather 
become co-constructions in social structure and interpretations of the natural world 
that then create a loop of legitimation for ideas or institutions that are created and 
reinforced. 
 
The Selfish Gene, then, does not cause or construct social gender, but, by analogy with nature,  
the normative notion of monogamy and of females demanding a long engagement and  
‘withholding copulation’ becomes  naturalized. When the notion is reapplied to human  
society, it is with added force. Although legislation and social control may indicate a social   
norm, a real life society is never either universally promiscuous or monogamous. Considering 
the anthropomorphic nature of the gender-based ESS model, the statement that “I have not 
explicitly talked about man, but inevitably, when we think about evolutionarily arguments 
such as those in this chapter, we cannot help reflecting about our own species and our 
experience”300 seems somewhat disingenuous. The focus is that of the inevitable human 
tendency of anthropocentrism, rendering the anthropomorphic model a matter of course rather 
than a matter of representational choice. While the analogy of human behaviour plays on 
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social norms and gendered bias this aspect is presented as marginal: analogy is to be read only 
as ‘illustrative examples’. Thus, criticism of the social aspects, along with their normative 
implications, of analogy is rendered unmentionable, and representative for the marginal 
‘other’ in opposition to the ideal reader. Hence, the loop of legitimation can only be detected 
in what would be defined as a misreading.    
 The predominant analogy of The Selfish Gene is that of economics – the governing 
principle of the cost-benefit calculation of ESS. Early in the book, gambling is introduced as a 
metaphor:  
We can carry the metaphor of gambling a little further. A gambler must think 
of three main quantities, stake, odds and prize. If the prize is very large, a gambler is 
prepared to risk a big stake. A gambler who risks his all on a single throw stands to 
gain a great deal. He also stands to lose a great deal, but on average high-stake 
gamblers are no better and no worse off than other players who play for low winnings 
with low stakes. An analogous comparison is that between speculative and safe 
investors on the stock market.
301
 
 
At this point, the concept of ESS has not yet been elucidated, and we may read the analogy as 
a heuristic device, preparing the reader for what is to come. The economic foundation is 
subsequently more firmly established:  
An ESS is stable, not because it is particularly good for the individuals participating 
in it, but simply because it is immune to treachery from within. ...  
Even in human pacts there is a constant danger that individuals will gain so 
much in the short term by breaking the pact that the temptation to do so will be 
overwhelming. Perhaps the best example of this is price fixing. It is in the long term 
interests of all individual garage owners to standardize the prize the price of petrol at 
some artificially high value. Price rings, based on conscious estimation of long term 
best interests, can survive for long periods. Every so often, however, an individual 
gives in to the temptation to make a quick killing by cutting his prices. Immediately, 
his neighbours follow suit, and a wave of price cutting spreads over the country ... So, 
even in man, a species with the gift of conscious foresight, pacts or conspiracies based 
on long-term best interests teeter constantly on the brink of collapse due to treachery 
from within. In wild animals, controlled by the struggling genes, it is even more 
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difficult to see ways in which group benefit or conspiracy strategies could possibly 
evolve. We must expect to find evolutionary stable strategies everywhere.
302
 
 
As demonstrated before, recognition is enforced by transition; the notion of treachery from 
within is applied to natural phenomena, reinserted in the human sphere, and then inserted 
back to wild animals. In a loop of legitimation, the phenomenon of price rings, which is an 
expression of a specific socio-political system of organization, is elevated to an expression of 
a universal principle. The personal political preferences of the author are in this respect highly 
irrelevant, indeed, the implications of the analogy may well be unintentional and even un-
reflected. The loop of legitimation moreover comes to govern the rationale of the text as the 
argumentation develops. For instance, the battle of the sexes is presented with reference to 
Trivers, among others, and Dawkins elaborates their ideas by extension and discussion. 
Trivers suggested that if a male goes through a long ‘engagement period’, he will have 
invested so much time and energy on her that he will be ‘committed’ to her, and thus less 
likely to desert her.
303
 At this point Dawkins corrects Trivers:  
He thought that prior investment in itself committed an individual to future investment. 
This is fallacious economics. A business man should never say ‘I have already invested so 
much in the Concorde airliner (for instance) that I cannot affords to scrap it now’.  
He should always ask instead whether it would pay him in the future, to cut his losses, and 
abandon the project now, even though he has already invested heavily in it.
304
    
   
 The loop of legitimation has taken analogy from ‘possibility to actuality’ where the rationale 
of economics has become synonymous with the rationale of nature to the extent that the 
conventions of economic consideration are no longer only a heuristic analogy. Rather, the 
logic of social phenomena is a governing principle to the extent that the establishment of a 
credible rationale for animal behaviour depends on the economical logic of the analogy. 
                                                          
302
 Ibid 72–73 (Dawkins’s italics) 
303
 Ibid 150 
304
 Ibid (Dawkins’s italics) 
Nilsen 95 
 
 
Again, this need not be an expression of the author’s personal stance; rather, it may be read as 
the reverse. Personal moral preferences are depicted as an irrational and sentimental 
counterpoint to the clear-thinking selfish gene theory, as demonstrated in the discussion of 
group selection. Within this paradigm, an economically based logic becomes defined as the 
morally unfortunate, but inevitably realistic rationale of nature. Hence, the notion of gene 
selfishness, or self interest, comes to represent a detached and disinterested view of life not in 
spite of, but because of its moral undesirability, and the capitalistic model of social 
organization becomes, in a loop of legitimation, the governing principle of the fundamental 
rationale on which the gene’s eye view rests.305             
  
 
3.4  Reading Nature  
 
 
W. D. Hamilton,
306
 in his review of The Selfish Gene,
307
 sees the book as representing the 
‘new face of evolution’ and asks rhetorically: “What then, is this new face of evolution? To a 
certain extent it is like a new interpretation of Shakespeare: it was all in the script but 
somehow it passed unseen.”308 In this notion lies an assumption of nature as readable, of an 
inner coherent structure that only needs discovery and revelation. The narrative of nature, 
then, is no longer depicted as a mode of writing rendering a text accessible to a general 
readership, as in Myer’s definition, but rather presumes the inner workings of a coherent 
nature. If the selfish gene theory does represent a reading of nature, we could distinguish 
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natural selection as the author function, and retrace the steps of this thesis to 2.1 “What is an 
Author?”   
[T]he author-function … is, rather, the result of a complex operation which constructs 
a certain rational being that we call ‘author’. Critics doubtless try to give this 
intelligible being a realistic status, by discerning a ‘deep’ motive, a ‘creative power’, 
or a ‘design,’ the milieu in which writing originates. Nevertheless, these aspects of an 
individual which we designate as making him an author are only a projection, in more 
or less psychologizing terms, of the operations that we force texts to undergo, the 
connections that we make, the traits that we establish as pertinent, the continuities that 
we recognize, or the exclusions that we practice.
309
 
    
Particularly pertinent to this discussion is the ‘deep motive’ that is discerned, not in the 
‘milieu in which writing originates’ but in the milieu in which evolution and Life originates.  
Hamilton’s notion that the selfish gene theory merely discovers ‘what was already in the 
script’ thus disregards the process of selectivity that is an inevitable component in any act of 
reading. Instead, the act of reading is portrayed as a window for universal truth, the revelation 
of a general pattern:    
 
What conjurers do with mirrors is nothing to what nature, if Dawkins is right, does 
with no more promising a starting material than congealed primeval soup. It will serve 
to characterize the new look that biology has in this and some other recent books (such 
as E. O. Wilson's Sociobiology) to say that it shines with a hope that these farthest 
extensions of life may soon fit more comprehensibly, in essence if not in some details 
(religious persons and Neo-Marxists may reverse that phrase if it suits them better), 
into a general pattern that includes the simplest cell wall, the simplest multicell body, 
and the blackbird's song.
310
 
 
The presupposition of a general pattern that may let itself be revealed becomes a governing 
principle of The Selfish Gene in the sense that the reading of nature that the book performs 
must give an exhaustive description of Life, this notion is supported by the preface to the 
second edition:   
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The gene’s eye view of Darwinism is implicit in the writings of R. A. Fisher 
and the other great pioneers of Neo-Darwinism in the early thirties, but was made 
explicit by W. D. Hamilton and G. C. Williams in the sixties. For me their insights had 
a visionary quality. But I found their expressions of it too laconic, not full throated 
enough. I was convinced that an amplified and developed version could make 
everything fall into place, in the heart as well as in the brain. I would write a book 
extolling the gene’s eye view of evolution.311  
 
The urge to make ‘everything fall into place, in the heart as well as in the brain’ makes it 
necessary to establish one ’fundamental rationale’ – a ‘deep motive’ around which natural 
selection takes place. As shown in 3.3 above, the rationale of modern Western social 
organization is projected to the workings of natural selection.  A fundamental question is then, 
in the words of Foucault: which operations take place in the representation of the gene’s eye 
view?  
 I have previously argued that the underlying rationality of the selfish genes is 
demonstrated by the portrayal of the survival machine as robot and the brain as computer, 
rendering irrationality possible only by default. Hence, the degree of a specific rationality that 
may be distinguished in behaviour becomes the prime measure for establishing the likelihood 
and credibility of a particular strategy, or rather in establishing a rationale behind the observed 
behaviour. This practice of interpretation and reading as scientific discovery opens for an 
extension of the behavioural analysis to make predictions, or even to conclude, on grounds of 
logical extension. Thus, the as-if calculations of representation are opened for extension to 
must-be conclusions of reading:   
Other species, such as kittiwakes form monogamous pair-bonds of exemplary fidelity, 
and both partners cooperate in the work of bringing up children. Here we must 
suppose that some evolutionary counter-pressure has been at work: there must be a 
penalty attached to the selfish mate-exploitation strategy as well as benefit, and in 
kittiwakes the penalty outweighs the benefit.
312
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Whereas the narrator on the one hand warns against interpretation of natural events based on 
what seems ‘intuitively sensible” ,313 the must-be conclusion indicates that intuition is indeed 
applicable to scientific theory, but only after it has been re-inscribed in terms of the 
established rationality.  
However, one exception is allowed for: The model of ‘coy’, ‘fast’, ‘faithful’ and 
‘philanderer’ turned out, upon testing, not to result in an evolutionary stable strategy as 
predicted, and the narrator remarks in an end note:  
By analogy with hawks and doves [the model of aggressive behaviour] I assumed, 
quite wrongly, that the cycle was hypothetical only, and that the system would really 
settle into a stable equilibrium. Schuster and Sigmund’s parting-shot leaves no more to 
be said: 
 
Briefly, then, we can draw two conclusions:   
(a) that the battle of the sexes has much in common with predation; and 
(b) that the behaviour of lovers is oscillating as the moon, and unpredictable as the 
weather. 
Of course, people didn’t need differential equations to notice this before.314  
 
Quoting the good-humoured conclusion of the mathematical biologists, Dawkins allows for 
irrationality to take place in nature, but, notably, only in relation to Love, playing on the 
culturally grounded recognition of the Romantic conception of love as mystical, inexplicable 
and inherently elusive. Thus, the battle of the sexes is momentarily re-configured from an 
example of the economy of exploitation to an esoteric exception.     
 Other than this exception, natural phenomena are read in accordance with the 
rationale, or ‘deep motive’ of selfish gene selection. The scientific event of reading opens for 
a range of alternative interpretations, where the scientist may ‘dream up’ solutions that 
confirm the theory, as in this example: 
Among birds and mammals, these cases of paternal devotion are exceptionally rare, 
but they are common among fish. Why? This is a challenge for the selfish gene theory 
which has puzzled me for a long time. An ingenious solution was recently suggested to 
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me in a tutorial by Miss T. R. Carlisle ... Because of the diffusion problem, the male 
must wait until the female spawns, and then he must shed his sperm over the eggs. But 
she has had a precious few seconds in which to disappear, leaving the male in 
possession and forcing him on to the horns of Trivers’ dilemma. So this theory neatly 
explains why paternal care is common in water but rare on land.
315
     
 
While an end note to the second edition informs that the reader this thought-experiment 
turned out not to stick in scientific testing, the ‘ingenious’ and ‘neat’ explanation illustrates 
the reading process directed towards the revelation of a general pattern:  the “continuities that 
are recognized”316 within the framework of the selfish gene theory. The theory, then, on the 
one hand opens for post-rationalizing explanation of natural phenomena, while on the other, it 
imposes a restrictive framework of interpretation, as in this example:       
In species that live in herds or troops, an orphaned youngster may be adopted by a 
strange female, most probably one that has lost her own child … In most cases we 
should probably regard adoption, however touching it might seem, as a misfiring of a 
built-in rule. This is because the generous female is doing her own genes no good by 
caring for the orphan. She is wasting time and energy which she could be investing in 
the lives of her own kin, particularly future children of her own. It is presumably a 
mistake that happens too seldom for natural selection to have ‘bothered’ to change the 
rule by making the maternal instinct more selective.
317
  
 
 
The designation of natural selection as an economically rational actor (notwithstanding the 
inverted commas renouncing any reference to actual consciousness) leaves only the 
interpretive alternative of a ‘misfiring of a built in rule’. Notably, the interpretation gains 
credibility in the offhand remark ‘touching as it may seem’, reinforcing the status of the 
selfish gene theory as the realistic and clear-thinking alternative opposing sentimental wishful 
thinking. Thus, the uneconomical behaviour of adoption, which contradicts the deep motive of 
nature, is rationalized within the theoretical framework, and irrationality as a natural 
phenomenon is excluded.  
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While the narrator goes on to present an example of monkey mothers stealing babies 
from other females and rearing them, an “example that is so extreme that you might prefer to 
regard it not as a mistake at all, but as evidence against the selfish gene theory”,318 Dawkins 
sees it as  
a double mistake since the adopter not only wastes her own time; she also releases a 
rival female from the burden of child-rearing, and frees her to have another child more 
quickly ... We need to know how often it happens; what the average relatedness 
between the adopter and child is likely to be; and what the attitude of the real mother 
of the child is ...
319
  
 
The challenge seems to be that of coming up with a rationally satisfactory underlying 
motivation for the kidnapping: “is it, after all, to [the real mother’s] advantage that the child 
should be adopted; do mothers deliberately try to deceive young naïve females into adopting 
their children? (It has also been suggested that adopters and baby-snatchers might benefit by 
gaining valuable practice in the art of child-bearing.)”320 These fundamentally hypothetical 
speculations are supported by the direct transition to cuckoos, well-known for laying eggs in 
other birds’ nests, and thus demonstrating an example of “deliberately engineered misfiring of 
maternal instinct.”321 Again, by means of transition, recognition takes the place of argument.  
 The essential question in both the example of paternal care in fish and in the 
discussion of adoption is why? Why do monkeys adopt; why do fish expose paternal care? 
The framework of the selfish gene theory determines whether the essential question should be 
why? or why not? Thus, its overarching perspective defines what it means to ‘ask the right 
question’, an idea which is amply discussed in the last of the additional chapters in the second 
edition. Here, the selfish gene as independent agent is illustrated by the phenomenon of 
segregation distorters: genes that have mutated to increase their own spread in a given 
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population, even if they have a negative effect on the body in which they sit.
322
 One might 
say, then, that the gene and the body are having a conflict of interests. The conflict is 
illustrated by the emergence of gene t in mice which has the effect either of early death or of 
sterilization, with the potential effect of causing a population of mice to go extinct.
323
 The 
appropriate question in discussing this phenomenon, according to the selfish gene theory, is 
not why? but rather the opposite: “Although segregation distorters exist they aren’t very 
common. We could go on to ask why they aren’t common ... We’ll find that the answer drops 
out once we have understood why organisms exist anyway.”324 Defining the right question is 
a crucial aspect of gaining power of definition:  
Questions about life are conventionally questions about organisms. Biologists ask why 
organisms do this, why organisms do that. They frequently ask why organisms group 
themselves into societies. They don’t ask – though they should – why living matter 
groups itself into organisms in the first place. Why isn’t the sea still a primordial 
battleground of free and independent replicators? Why did the ancient replicators club 
together to make, and reside in, lumbering robots, and why are those robots – you and 
me – so large and so complicated?325       
 
The argument is back to where it started in Chapter One, “Why are People?” – published 13 
years before the second edition, but this time it is posed with greater force, since it is no 
longer introducing a novel perspective, but extending and elaborating on the same idea. These 
questions thus represent the new perspective, in opposition to the old and dated views of 
biology, as is clear from the subsequent assertion:  “To solve our problem, we have to begin 
by purging our minds of old attitudes that covertly take the individual organism for granted; 
otherwise we shall be begging the question.”326 Old attitudes stand in the way of the new and 
progressive perspective of the selfish gene theory. Towards the end of the additional chapter 
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of the second edition, the ‘narrative of nature’, the narrative perspective usually adopted in 
popular science, becomes merged with a notion of scientific process as a linear movement of 
progress. The two constitutes and supports the argumentative ‘narrative of science’ in mutual 
reinforcement:  
At some point in the evolution of life on our earth, this ganging up of mutually 
compatible replicators began to be formalized in the creation of discrete vehicles – 
cells and, later, many-celled bodies.  … 
This packaging of living material into discrete vehicles became such a salient 
and dominant feature that, when biologists arrived on the scene and started asking 
questions about life, their questions were mostly about vehicles – individual 
organisms. The individual organism came first in the biologist’s consciousness, while 
the replicators – now known as genes – were seen as part of the machinery used by 
individual organisms. It requires a deliberate mental effort to turn biology the right 
way up again, and remind ourselves that the replicators come first, in importance as 
well as in history.
327
  
 
The normative effect is extensive and renders the assumptions on which the selfish gene 
theory rests universal, a condition for all biological research; with the selfish gene theory, 
biology has been ‘turned the right way up again’. The progressive and linear progress of 
science is mirrored in the progressive and linear genetic development – hence the affirmative 
quality of the narrative is doubled. Elsdon-Baker comments on the normative effect of the 
depiction of science as linear progress:  
It is all too easy to paint a picture that seems to show that we have marched inevitably 
towards a modern gene-centric model of evolution. But is this really the case? This 
kind of progressionist history can serve only to reinforce the perspective of researchers 
today. In some ways it can act to reinforce dogma and constraint debate – after all, 
nobody wants to be labelled as being part of an anti-Darwinian or a Lamarckian 
tradition.
328
  
 
The suggestion that the selfish gene theory may have the effect of ‘constraining debate’, as 
proposed elsewhere in this thesis, concerns the effect on the general public. The Selfish 
Gene’s merging of the personal sphere with scientific theory may have the effect of 
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establishing a public scientific common sense. Moreover, the assumptions and implications of 
the selfish gene theory, when depicted as the only sensible perspective on evolution, may 
constrain the range of potential biological explanation. While constraint is to some extent 
necessary for all research, the question is whether the restrictions that the selfish gene theory 
imposes are productive.  
Somewhat paradoxically, the representation of the selfish gene theory is also 
problematic due to the notion of revealing a universal principle, the endeavour to “make 
everything fall into place in the heart as well as in the brain.”329 As Dawkins points out in a 
response to criticism in an end note to a fundamental assumption behind the theory:  
My wager that all life, everywhere in the universe, would turn out to have evolved by 
Darwinian means has now been spelt out and justified more fully in my paper 
“Universal Darwinism” and in the last chapter of The Blind Watchmaker. I show that 
all the alternatives to Darwinism that have ever been suggested are in principle 
incapable of doing the job of explaining the organized complexity of life. The 
argument is a general one, not based upon particular facts about life as we know it. As 
such it has been criticised by scientists pedestrian enough to think that slaving over a 
hot test tube (or cold muddy boot) is the only method of discovery in science. One 
critic complained that my argument was ‘philosophical’, as though that was a 
sufficient condemnation. Philosophical or not, the fact is that neither he nor anyone 
else has found any flaw in what I said. And ‘in principle’ arguments such as mine, far 
from being irrelevant to the real world, can be more powerful than arguments based on 
particular factual research.
330
     
 
One reason why the ‘in principle’ arguments of The Selfish Gene are indeed powerful is that 
they are not easily disputable, because they are based in an inner logic and persuasive rhetoric 
rather than on scientifically verifiable evidence. While some aspects of the selfish gene theory 
as presented in the book undoubtedly have scientific value and have influenced biology, its 
all-embracing scope, in combination with a perspective which excludes alternative answers as 
marginal, in sum exercises an imposing power of definition with regard to what should be 
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deemed  ‘acceptable science’. The hypothetical ‘in principle’ presumes a scientific warrant of 
truth without adhering to a scientific method which is the required validation of such truth.  
On a personal level, the aspect of personal recognition and identification as a structural 
component gives the book an intrusive effect, which can be said to go beyond the scope of the 
scientific mandate of assertion. In the process of unfolding the ‘fundamental rationale of the 
gene’ – a perspective which in scientific terms may be seen as either speculative or in 
productive, depending on whether or not it is evaluated as ‘good poetic science’ – this 
rationale becomes inscribed as Meaning of Life. The aim to produce an exhaustive 
explanation for Life, and therefore also an exhaustive definition of the Meaning of Life, has 
been criticised as totalitarian and arrogant, but may equally well be labelled naïve. The 
Darwinism of The Selfish Gene, then, is fundamentally different from the Darwinism of the 
Origin:  
The imaginative release into a continuing and undescribed future is remarkable when 
it is set alongside the positivistic emphasis on finality which we find in Comte, a 
suggestion that the positive and scientific have now achieved mastery and that the 
world may fully and definitively be described forever. Darwin persistently emphasises 
physical process, not completed idea.
331
  
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion: 
 
In this analysis I have shown how The Selfish Gene can be read as a many-layered work 
which operates on several levels of meaning. On a purely scientific level, Dawkins’s book has 
come to represent the shift within the community of evolutionary theory from the idea of 
natural selection working for the good of the species, to a gene-centred view of evolution. As 
mentioned, this perspective does not originate with Richard Dawkins; rather, The Selfish Gene 
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serves to promote this perspective, aiming to elaborate the concept and bring together the 
views of scientists like Fisher, Hamilton, Williams, Trivers and Maynard Smith in a new 
perspective on evolutionary theory.  
Hamilton, in a review of Dawkins’s book, has referred to this perspective as a new 
reading of nature, a conception which I have elaborated above. The notion of the selfish gene 
theory as a reading of nature opens for two insights: In an exhaustive reading aiming to make 
‘everything fall into place in the heart as well as in the brain’ as I have discussed above, Neo-
Darwinism is presented as the one valid approach to evolutionary theory. In consequence, 
nature is presented as corresponding to human reason and logic, a complete entity open to 
unequivocal interpretation and deciphering. Thus, it can be argued that The Selfish Gene 
comes to promote a positivistic, Comtian notion of a completed, and all-encompassing, theory 
of Life. 
  Within this scheme, I have argued that the selfish gene theory as a ‘reading of nature’ 
fails to acknowledge that reading must necessarily be selective and therefore cannot aspire to 
be exhaustive. This claim does not mean that all readings are equally valid, but rather that two 
readings are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Also relevant for this problematization is 
Beer’s definition of reading as an essentially question-raising procedure as discussed in the 
introduction above.  The Selfish Gene is concerned with defining ‘the right question’, as I 
have argued in Chapter 3 above. Upon examination, these questions seem to be formulated in 
accordance with a pre-supposed answer. Thus, the explanations that The Selfish Gene offers 
take the form of post-rationalisation of animal behaviour, based in an assumption of the 
phenotype as an automatic and linear expression of the genotype, as I have discussed in 
chapter 2.            
 Whether it is representational or methodological, this assumption, along with the 
purpose-bound definition of the gene as a ‘unity of convenience’ fulfils the Third Culture 
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ideal of ‘clarity of language’, and what the biologist Alan Grafen, in his reading of The Selfish 
Gene (in 1.2 above) recognizes as a ‘transparency of exposition’. The transparency of the 
scientific representation suggests an unequivocal, straightforward meaning which literary 
textual strategies illuminate and extend in accordance with the notion of good poetic science. 
Within this scheme, literary strategies are not seen as carriers of meaning in themselves other 
than as means of facilitating understanding and fuelling scientific creativity and innovation.  
 However, the idea of a purely scientific message requiring a straightforward reading, 
in effect a reading which would purge the text of its literary ‘sugar-coating’, stands in stark 
contrast to the emotional appeal of poetic science. As we have seen, ‘good poetic science’ 
may “conjure in the mind images and allusions that go beyond the needs of straightforward 
understanding” and “explain something so that the reader feels it in the marrow of his bones”. 
The tension between the demands of a detached, scientific reading and the emotional appeal 
of The Selfish Gene is illustrated by the construction of an ideal reader who is instructed to 
modify the meaning potential of the textual strategies of personification and identification. 
While on the one hand addressing the reader on an emotional level, playing on personal 
recognition, the narrator dismisses this address by instructing the reader to unread the 
anthropocentric relevance as well as the notion of intention that is inscribed in the 
personification of genes and vehicles. Thus, the text appeals to an intuitive understanding, but 
also checks and ‘edits’ this intuitive understanding.  
As I have argued in the my analysis, the duality of recognition on the one hand and the 
insistence on the merely metaphorical quality on the other – the plea to the reader to believe 
and not to believe, to read and not to read at the same time – has the potential to evoke in the 
reader a ‘willed suspension of disbelief’. These textual strategies make possible, through 
recognition, the transition from the ‘hypothetically possible’ to the ‘actual’ in Dawkins’s text. 
This transition can be said be enforced by the use of social analogy as merely illustrative 
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device, leaving unread the presumptions on which the analogy, in particular social analogy, is 
based. Recognition, then, becomes meaning-governing, and in consequence, social 
circumstances become naturalized, while natural phenomena come to reflect social 
organization in what Rodgers terms a ‘loop of legitimation’. 
In my analysis of what Dawkins refers to as the genetic rationale, I have claimed that 
the loop of legitimation is crucial for his argumentation, to the extent that it may be read as a 
case of ‘bad poetic science’ where the writer becomes seduced by his own literary devices. 
The Selfish Gene moves rapidly between the hypothetical and the factual, between the 
material and the abstract, and as a result, the literary devices, such as analogy, are not always 
easily distinguishable from the argumentative structure. A further example of this confusion is 
the narrative of nature within which the gene, or replicator, is presented. While this textual 
strategy is initially introduced as a hypothetical organizing principle, it becomes, through the 
course of the book, a constitutional element supporting the argument – Myer’s narrative of 
science. The fusion of these two modes of narrativity, as I have shown in 3.4 above, gains 
added argumentative force when the notion of science as a linear process of progression is 
invoked with the claim that biology with the selfish gene theory has been turned ‘the right 
way up again’.    
The somewhat authoritative methodological control that the narrator exercises, which, 
I have argued, makes possible the construction of an ideal reader supporting a polemical 
representation of science, can be seen as based in an assumption of the (lay-)reader as an ideal 
reader passively absorbing scientific claims. This particularly regards the appeal to the reader 
to unread certain elements of meaning, and thus take on the responsibility of reading the text 
in accordance with its intended meaning.  This textual strategy should be seen in relation to 
the PUS-model (Public Understanding of Science) of science communication, which aims to 
educate a generally uninformed ‘public’. PUS has been increasingly challenged by the PEST-
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model (Public Engagement in Science and Technology), which Elsdon-Baker promotes.
332
 An 
important difference between the two models is the conception of the ‘public’, which from a 
PEST point of view includes “a vast array of people, from school-children right through to 
scientists from other disciplines, and even those who themselves work in science 
communication or even science policy.”333 In short, the PEST-model focuses on dialogue, 
while the PUS-model gives emphasis to public enlightenment. With this in mind, the 
democratic endeavour of Third Culture – as presented in the discussion above – the notion of 
‘public scientists communicating directly with the public,’ and thus representing a democratic 
distribution of knowledge, through popularization or ‘public science,’ becomes questionable.  
 Through his professional status, Dawkins as a public scientist represents an authority 
on the question of how public science should be read. On the grounds of this authority, 
readings paying heed to the representational structure of public science books like The Selfish 
Gene may be effectively marginalized and dismissed as misreadings, as demonstrated by the 
polemic between Dawkins and Midgley when the book was first published. Furthermore, the 
polemic depiction of all criticism as ‘constructivist’ and of critics as ill-willed pedants 
contributes to a self-proclaimed power of definition. In order to take a more general approach 
to this issue, it could be productive to take into consideration the field of Scientific Literacy, 
which Dawkins is currently teaching at the New College of Humanities, and pose the 
questions: Who defines what constitutes Scientific Literacy? Is Scientific Literacy the ability 
to filter a work of ‘public science’ of textual strategies and absorb only a ‘straightforward 
meaning’? Or is it the ability to perform a critical reading of scientific works? On the 
background of this thesis, I would suggest that the recognition of textual strategies and their 
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effect on scientific representation may productively be included in the concept of Scientific 
Literacy.  
  Addressing the notion of ‘poetic science,’ one might ask whether the textual strategies 
of allusion and conjuration rest on, and thus consequentially establish, a specific common 
sense when they seen as mere illuminating devices. One way of exploring this issue could be 
to invoke the question: can ‘public science’ be said to establish modern myths? The zoologist 
Peter Medawar, in his Romanes lecture “Science and Literature,” separates between 
“commonsensical or scientific truths” and “truthlike structures” of myths which are “excused 
from public examination”334:   
 
[A] myth, especially if it appeals to magical agencies – will be judged true if it is all 
of a piece, hangs together, doesn’t contradict itself, leaves no loose ends, and can cope 
with the unexpected. No single word in common speech describes this set of 
properties, but a narrative or theory or world picture or imaginative structure of any 
kind which answers to them is said to ‘make sense’, to have the property of being 
believable-in. All scientific theories must make sense, of course, but in addition they 
are expected to conform to reality, to be empirically true. It is the relaxation of this 
condition, or the failure to enforce it, that opens up to us a world that is larger, more 
various, and perhaps more doctrinable than real life
335
. 
 
In my analysis above, I suggested that The Selfish Gene comes to project to natural selection 
what Foucault terms a ‘deep motive’ of inherent rationality to natural selection, and I have 
showed how this deep motive is constituted by social analogy. The construction of this deep 
motive can be said to correspond to the mythic qualities that Medawar distinguishes of ‘a 
narrative or theory or world picture or imaginative structure of any kind’, notably in addition 
to scientific facts. This mythic aspect of The Selfish Gene, when read into Medawar’s 
argument, may thus contribute to a public common sense because it carries with it the 
potential of being ‘more doctrinable than real life’ or, in this context, more doctrinable than its 
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purely scientific message. By extension, one might ask whether the genre of ‘public science’ 
in addition to, or as a result of, opening for the incorporation of literary devices in scientific 
texts, also opens for a ‘relaxation of the scientific demand of empirical truth’ that Medawar 
recognizes – a relaxation which is elusive because it is juxtaposed to scientific facts. 
 In order to further explore this question, the view of science that is promoted in 
Dawkins’s Unweaving the Rainbow could be addressed. In this book, the ‘scientific gaze’ is 
employed on matters like Law and poetry, and it is here that the notion of poetic science is 
introduced. A closer reading of this work might contribute to a development of the notion of 
poetic science which could be applied on further literary studies of ‘public science.’ 
Additionally, it might be interesting to analyse the specific ‘scientific gaze’ that Unweaving 
the Rainbow operates with, considering, as I hope this thesis have established, that ‘science’ is 
not an unequivocal denotation of a singular and clearly defined approach to the world.   
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